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“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (g) engage in conduct that the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know is harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity,
marital status or socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.”1
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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of a turbulent presidential election, the resurgence of the Black
Lives Matter movement, and stark backlash over same-sex marriage, immigration
reform and transgender bathrooms, our country is no stranger to the concepts of
bias and discrimination. Likewise, our justice system faces scrutiny with claims of
prevalent bias and prejudice within its midst. Though our legal system is heralded
as having been founded on the principles of fairness and equity, statistical and
anecdotal evidence show that our courtrooms are rife with bias and
discrimination.2 Moreover, despite the diversity of law school classes, our legal
profession is homogenous, dominated by a single race and gender.3 In recently
evaluating this issue, American Bar Association Immediate Past President Paulette
Brown stated that “[d]iscrimination and harassment on the basis of gender, race,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability, marital and socioeconomic status is, and
unfortunately continues to be, a problem in our profession and in society.”4 She
further noted that “[e]xisting steps have not been enough to end such
discrimination and harassment” in the judicial system.5
In response, on August 8, 2016, the American Bar Association (ABA) House
of Delegates approved Resolution 109, which proposed an amendment to Model
Rule 8.4 to incorporate an anti-harassment and anti-discrimination provision into
the black letter rules governing the professional conduct of lawyers.6 Resolution
109 sought to strengthen ethics protections for protected classes and advance the
ABA’s goal of eliminating bias, harassment and discrimination in the legal
profession.7
Prior to the passage of Resolution 109, discrimination was addressed through
Model Rule 8.4(d), which makes it professional misconduct for a lawyer “to
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”8 However,
the prior rule provided insufficient protection against discrimination and
harassment for at least three reasons. First, as articulated in Comment 3 of the
rule, bias or prejudice by an attorney only rose to the level of misconduct if the
discriminatory behavior occurred “in the course of representing a client” and only
if the conduct met the high standard of being “prejudicial to the administration of
justice.”9 Second, this anti-discrimination provision was absent from the black

2. See infra Part II(A).
3. See infra Part II(B).
4. Transcript of American Bar Association Public Hearing at 6 (Feb. 7, 2016) (transcribing ABA
Immediate Past President Paulette Brown’s address at the American Bar Association Public Hearing
on Resolution 109), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional
_responsibility/aba_model_rule%208_4_comments/february_2016_public_hearing_transcript.authche
ckdam.pdf.
5. Id.
6. See Annual Meeting 2016: ABA Amends Model Rules to Add Anti-Discrimination, Anti-Harassment
Provision, AMER. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives /2016/08/
annual_meeting_20161.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017); see also AMER. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 109
(ADOPTED AS REVISED) (2016).
7. See AMER. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: REVISED RESOLUTION 2 (2016).
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
9. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1998) (emphasis added).
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letter rules—it was only mentioned in the comments to the rule, which are
advisory and not adopted by every state.10 Finally, the prior rule failed to address
harassment at all.
Resolution 109 added a new paragraph (g) to Model Rule 8.4 explicitly
addressing discrimination and harassment in the black letter rules and expanding
the bounds of conduct that may give rise to disciplinary action to “conduct related
to the practice of law.”11 Though advisory, the new Comment 3 clarifies that
discriminatory conduct “includes harmful verbal or physical conduct that
manifests bias or prejudice towards others.”12 Moreover, the new Comment 4
expands the breadth of interactions or conduct that could result in a violation,
including “interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers and
others while engaged in the practice of law” and “participating in bar association,
business or social activities in connection with the practice of law.”13
Despite the incredible strides made because of Resolution 109, Model Rule
8.4(g) leaves open a critical issue with implementation. The new rule states that it
is professional misconduct if a lawyer engages in conduct that the lawyer “knows
or reasonably should know” is discrimination.14 This begs the question whether
the rule obligates lawyers to become culturally competent or whether it
encourages lawyers to blind themselves to bias present in the practice of law to
avoid being subject to this rule. In other words, how culturally competent is the
“reasonable lawyer”? Does the “reasonable lawyer” have no or limited training
on cultural competency? Or does the “reasonable lawyer” purposefully attempt
to be culturally aware and mindful? Though adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g) is a
necessary step toward forestalling bias and discrimination in the judicial system,
it will not sufficiently do so without the implementation of additional safeguards
and a cultural shift within the legal profession.
This Article first provides the history of Model Rule 8.4 and the concepts of
bias and discrimination in the legal profession. Next, this Article argues that it
should no longer be acceptable for lawyers to turn a blind eye and insulate
themselves and the legal profession from the obligation to make cultural
competency a core aspect of legal education and practice. It will first focus on legal
education, urging the ABA to revise its accreditation standards to require cultural
competency coursework. It will then focus on the legal profession, urging states
to take three steps—adopt Model Rule 8.4(g), revise, where applicable, its
continuing legal education requirements to require cultural competency
education, and hold lawyers accountable for violating the rule. Finally, this Article
proposes a revision to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to ensure that the
judiciary is able to “perform the duties of judicial office . . . without bias or

10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble & Scope [14] (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016)
(“Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance
with the Rules.”); id. at Preamble & Scope [21] (“The Comments are intended as guides to
interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative.”).
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (emphasis added).
12. Id. at r. 8.4 cmt. 3.
13. Id. at r. 8.4 cmt. 4.
14. Id. at r. 8.4(g).
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prejudice.”15 Removing, as much as practical, bias and discrimination from our
legal profession will encourage all lawyers and judges to become more self-aware.
This, in turn, will ensure the fair and equitable treatment of all individuals
partaking or engaged in our justice system.
I.

MODEL RULE 8.4 – ITS HISTORY & APPLICATION

In 1983, the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which prescribe baseline standards of legal
ethics and professional responsibility for attorneys in the United States.16 With the
assistance of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility’s Policy
Implementation Committee, each state, with the exception of California, has
adopted rules of professional conduct that follow the format of or closely align
with the Model Rules.17
When the Model Rules were first adopted, they did not directly or indirectly
address bias, discrimination, prejudice or harassment. Eleven years later, the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (SCEPR) and the
ABA Young Lawyers Division launched an effort to correct this omission, each
proposing a new paragraph (g) to Model Rule 8.4.18 However, the initiative faced
such strong opposition that the proposals were withdrawn before the House of
Delegates could vote.19
In 1998, the SCEPR and the ABA Criminal Justice Section reignited the
initiative, each proposing new language to add an anti-discrimination provision
into the Model Rules. Rather than modifying the black letter rules, the separate
proposals were combined into the preexisting Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4, and
adopted by the House of Delegates at the ABA’s Annual Meeting in August 1998.20
This read:
A lawyer who in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words
or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d)
when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate
advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial
judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory
basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule.21

15. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
16. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR PROF’L RESP.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profes
sional_conduct.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). Prior to the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA’s
standards of professional responsibility for lawyers were governed under the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, see MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980), and prior to the
Model Code, governed under the Canons of Professional Ethics, see CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (AM.
BAR ASS’N 1956).
17. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 16.
18. See AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 2.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1998).
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As noted by Myles V. Lynk, Chair of the SCEPR, the House of Delegates’
adoption of the preexisting Comment 3 to Model Rule 8.4 marked “the first and
only time that a substantive provision in the rules was not added to a rule itself but
was placed in a comment.”22
A decade later, former ABA President Bill Neukum led an initiative to
reformulate the ABA’s objectives into four goals adopted by the House of
Delegates in 2008.23 Goal III, entitled “Eliminate Bias and Enhance Diversity,”
includes two objectives: (i) “[p]romote full and equal participation in the
association, our profession, and the justice system by all persons”; and (ii)
“[e]liminate bias in the legal profession and the justice system.”24 In 2014, the ABA
Commission on Women in the Profession, the ABA Commission on Racial and
Ethnic Diversity in the Profession, the ABA Commission on Disability Rights, and
the ABA Commission on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (collectively, the
“Goal III Commissions”) sent a joint letter to the SCEPR, requesting that the Model
Rules incorporate an anti-discrimination and anti-harassment provision. In the
letter, the Goal III Commissions noted that Model Rule 8.4(d) was insufficient to
fulfill Goal III because it “[did] not facially address bias, discrimination, or
harassment and [did] not thoroughly address the scope of the issue in the legal
profession or legal system.”25 The Goal III Commissions further argued that the
preexisting Comment 3:
[A]ddresse[d] bias and prejudice only within the scope of legal representation and
only when it [was] prejudicial to the administration of justice. This limitation
fail[ed] to cover bias or prejudice in other professional capacities (including
attorneys as advisors, counselors, and lobbyists) or other professional settings
(such as law schools, corporate law departments, and employer-employee
relationships within law firms). The comment also [did] not address harassment
at all, even though the judicial rules do so.26

The Goal III Commissions’ letter sparked an investigation by the SCEPR to
determine whether and how the Model Rules should be amended to address
discrimination, harassment and bias in the practice of law. After forming a
working group consisting of representatives from the SCEPR, the Association of
Professional Responsibility Lawyers, the National Organization of Bar Counsel
and each of the Goal III Commissions, the SCEPR engaged in deliberations for over
a year. On July 8, 2015, the SCEPR released a draft proposal for comment to amend

22. Myles V. Lynk, Chair of the ABA Standing Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Resp., Remarks at
the ABA House of Delegates Annual Meeting 2016 7:45-7:55 (Aug. 8, 2016) (emphasis added),
http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2016/08/annual_meeting_20161.html.
23. See AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 1.
24. See ABA Mission and Goals, AMER. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/about_the
_aba/aba-mission-goals.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
25. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 3 (citing Letter from Goal III Commissions to Paula J.
Frederick, Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 2011-2014); see
also AMER. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROF’L RESP., WORKING DISCUSSION DRAFT –
REVISIONS TO MODEL RULE 8.4: LANGUAGE CHOICE NARRATIVE 1 (2015) (likewise acknowledging the
limitation of Model Rule 8.4(d)).
26. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 2 (citing Letter from Goal III Commissions to Paula J.
Frederick, Chair, ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 2011-2014).
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Model Rule 8.4.27 Later that month, the SCEPR also hosted an open invitation
roundtable discussion of the proposal at the ABA’s Annual Meeting.28 After
receiving and evaluating numerous comments, the SCEPR published a revised
draft of the proposal on December 22, 2015, invited written comments, and hosted
a public hearing at the ABA Midyear Meeting in February 2016.29
On May 31, 2016, the SCEPR filed its initial Resolution 109 and an
accompanying report with the House of Delegates,30 which sparked significant
controversy.31 Opponents raised several concerns regarding the implementation
of the new rule. First, opponents argued that historically, Model Rule 8.4 has been
solely concerned with regulating attorney conduct that might adversely affect an
attorney’s ability to practice law and with preserving the integrity of the judicial
system. The new rule, they argued, addresses neither of those issues.32 Second,
Model Rule 8.4(d) and the preexisting Comment 3 provides the proper level of
guidance to lawyers, making inclusion of an anti-discrimination and antiharassment provision in the black letter of the rules unnecessary.33 Third,
“attorneys may be subject to professional discipline for acting in accordance with
their professional and moral judgment when making decisions about whether to
accept, reject or withdraw from certain cases because attorneys will be forced to

27. See id. at 4.
28. See id.
29. AMER. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROF’L RESP., NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING
(2015); see also AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 4; Comments to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4,
AMER. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_
commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/modruleprofconduct8_4/mr_8_4_comments.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
30. See AMER. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RESOLUTION (2016).
31. See Lorelei Laird, Discrimination and Harassment Will Be Legal Ethics Violations Under ABA Model
Rule, ABA J., Aug. 8, 2016, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/house_of_delegates_strongly_
agrees_to_rule_making_discrimination_and_harass (noting that Resolution 109 attracted
“condemnation from politically conservative attorneys, some of whom sent a letter to ABA House of
Delegates Chair Patricia Lee Refo, arguing that the rule harms free speech and religious freedom, and
wrote an op-ed in the National Law Journal (sub. req.) insisting that the resolution was driven by ‘PC
politics’ rather than professional ability”).
32. See Ronald Rotunda, The ABA’s Control Over What Lawyers Say Around the Water Cooler, HARV.
L. REC. (Oct. 4, 2016), http://hlrecord.org/2016/10/the-abas-control-over-what-lawyers-say-around-thewater-cooler/ (“Is it the best use of scarce Bar resources to discipline lawyers who may violate a vague
rule that prohibits some speech because the speech relates to conduct that does not violate state or
federal law but does violate the new Rule 8.4(g)? It’s not as if the disciplinary authorities are looking
for things to do. There are plenty of lawyers who are incompetent, commingle trust funds, or cheat
third parties.”); Herbert W. Titus & William J. Olson, ‘PC’ Politics Drove ABA’s Proposed Rules Changes,
NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 8, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202764489288/PC-Politics-DroveABAs-Proposed-Rules-Changes?slreturn=20170027005211 (quoting Ben Strauss, past president of the
Delaware State Bar Association, as stating that “the purpose of the rules delimiting ethical misconduct
is ‘one that goes to the character that impacts on the person’s ability to deliver legal services,’ not one
‘regulating social behavior,’” and arguing that “[l]egal ethics should be predicated on preserving the
integrity of the lawyers and the tribunals before which they practice,” not on “violating today’s notion
of ‘political correctness’”).
33. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 5.
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take cases or clients they might have otherwise declined.”34 Fourth, the new rule
conflicts with the well-known practices of jury selection often grounded on the
notions of bias and stereotypes.35 And, finally, attorneys may be sanctioned for
expression that is protected by the First Amendment.36
In preparation for the House of Delegates meeting, the SCEPR filed a revised
version of Resolution 109 and its accompanying report on August 3, 2016,37
addressing or responding to several of the opponents’ concerns. In response to
arguments concerning the necessity of Resolution 109, the SCEPR noted that
twenty-five jurisdictions had already concluded that Model Rule 8.4(d) and the
preexisting Comment 3 were insufficient to protect against bias, prejudice and
harassment in the legal profession and had therefore adopted anti-discrimination
and/or anti-harassment provisions into the black letter of their rules of
professional conduct.38 It further noted that only thirteen jurisdictions addressed

34. Sarah C. Haan & Dominic Lovotti, Eliminating Bias, Harassment, and Discrimination in the Legal
Profession: Proposed Changes to Model Rule 8.4, 59 ADVOCATE 23, 24 (2016).
35. See Email from Steven A. Weiss, Chair, ABA Section of Litigation, to Myles V. Lynk, Chair,
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (Jun. 20, 2016, 12:04 CST),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_model
_rule%208_4_comments/aba_section_of_litigation_comment.authcheckdam.pdf (referencing and
enclosing prior letters expressing concern regarding the interplay between jury selection and the
proposed change to the model rule).
36. See Eugene Volokh, A Speech Code for Lawyers, Banning Viewpoints that Express “Bias,” Including
in Law-Related Social Activities, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/10/a-speech-code-for-lawyers-banning-viewpoints-thatexpress-bias-including-in-law-related-social-activities-2/?utm_term=.05fb9926c273 (“So say that some
lawyers put on a Continuing Legal Education event that included a debate on same-sex marriage, or
on whether there should be limits on immigration from Muslim countries, or on whether people should
be allowed to use the bathrooms that correspond to their gender identify rather than their biological
sex. In the process, unsurprisingly, the debater on one side said something that was critical of gays,
Muslims or transgender people. If the rule is adopted, the debater could well be disciplined by the
state bar.”); Letter from First Liberty to Patricia Lee Refo, Chair, ABA House of Delegates 1 (Aug. 5,
2016), https://www.scribd.com/document/320478002/Aba-8-4-Ltr-Em-ks (stating that the proposed
change to Model Rule 8.4 “is a clear and extraordinary threat to free speech and religious liberty, and
if adopted with the force of law by any bar, would be an unprecedented violation of the First
Amendment”). Relatedly, opponents raised the concern that religious organizations or attorneys
affiliated with religious organizations will not be able to be selective about clientele or hiring practices.
See Letter from Office of the General Counsel, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, to
American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 7-8 (Mar. 10,
2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba /administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_
model_rule%208_4_comments/moses_3_11_16.authcheckdam.pdf (arguing that the proposed text of
the Model Rule should make plain that the “rule against discrimination based on religion does not
apply to lawyers employed by or representing a religious organization . . . [or] where application of
the rule would impede the organization’s right to adopt and enforce religiously-based employee
conduct standards”).
37. See Revised Resolution 109 Adopted by ABA HOD, AMER. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.
org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility
/modruleprofconduct8_4.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
38. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 5 (citing CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2-400 (2015);
COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2016); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-8.4(d) (2017);
IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.4(a) (2014); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(j) (2016); IND.
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the issue by adopting the existing Comment 3 into their rules39; while fourteen
jurisdictions do not address the issue in their rules at all.40 The SCEPR argued that
Resolution 109 aligned the Model Rules with the anti-discrimination and antiharassment provisions present in the black letter of other codes of conduct,
including the Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function.41 It also pointed to
ample evidence that bias and discrimination is prevalent in the practice of law.42
The SCEPR added the following language in the black letter rule to address
concerns regarding a lawyer’s ability to make decisions as to whether or not to
take on a particular case or client: “This paragraph does not limit the ability of a
lawyer to accept, decline or withdraw from a representation in accordance with
Rule 1.16.”43 It also added the following language to Comment 5 of the rule: “A
lawyer does not violate paragraph (g) by limiting the scope or subject matter of
the lawyer’s practice”44; and “[a] lawyer may charge and collect reasonable fees
and expenses for a representation.”45 To address concerns that lawyers would be
unable to vigorously represent their clients or would be required to reject clients
with unpopular views or controversial positions, the SCEPR added the following
language: “This paragraph does not preclude legitimate advice or advocacy

RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2016); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2012); MD.
LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(e) (2016); MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(i) (2016);
MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.5 (2015); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g), (h) (2015); MO.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-8.4(g) (2012); NEB. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (2008); N.J. RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2015); N.M. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 16-300 (2016); N.Y. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2013); N.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(f) (2006); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2016); OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a)(7) (2015); R.I. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (2007); TEX. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.08 (2016); VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 8.4(g) (2009); WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2015); WIS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(i)
(2017); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 9.1) (2017)).
39. Id. at 5-6 (citing ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. (2004); ARK. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2014); CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4, commentary (2007); DEL.
LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2010); IDAHO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3
(2014); ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2014); N.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 5
(2003); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2017); S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3
(2004); TENN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2011); UTAH RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt.
3 (2015); W. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmt. 3 (2015); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4
cmt. 3) (2014)).
40. Id. at 6 (noting that Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Virginia do not address
the issues of bias, discrimination or harassment in their rules of professional conduct).
41. Id.
42. Id. (highlighting a 2015 survey by the Florida Bar’s Young Lawyer’s Division of its female
members where 43 percent of respondents reported experiencing gender bias and 17 percent reported
experiencing harassment in their career (citing THE FLORIDA BAR, RESULTS OF THE 2015 YLD SURVEY ON
WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 9 (2015)).
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also AMER. BAR ASS’N,
supra note 7, at 14.
44. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
45. Id. at r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (citing Model Rule 1.5(a)).
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consistent with these Rules.”46 It also included the following language to
Comment 5 of the rule: “A lawyer’s representation of a client does not constitute
an endorsement by the lawyer of the client’s views or activities.”47 Responding to
concerns regarding jury selection, the SCEPR inserted the following language into
Comment 5 of the rule (commonly referred to as the “Batson Sentence”48): “A trial
judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory
basis does not alone establish a violation of paragraph (g).”49 And, finally, in
response to concerns of overreach and violations of protected speech or religious
liberty, the SCEPR stated:
Proposed new paragraph (g) to Rule 8.4 is a reasonable, limited and necessary
addition to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. It will make it clear that it is
professional misconduct to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know constitutes harassment or discrimination while engaged in conduct
related to the practice of law. And as has already been shown in the jurisdictions
that have such a rule, it will not impose an undue burden on lawyers.50

During the House of Delegates meeting, there were no speakers in
opposition, and 69 delegates indicated their desire to speak in favor of the
resolution.51 On a final voice vote, Resolution 109 passed.52 It is now in the hands
of the states to determine whether to adopt Model Rule 8.4(g) and its
accompanying comments or to modify their existing rules of professional conduct
in response to this change.
II. BIAS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION & THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Though the effort to revise Model Rule 8.4 began over two years prior to
approval, Resolution 109 was submitted to the ABA House of Delegates during a
turbulent time in our country’s history. With society fractured over issues such as
women’s rights, minority rights, immigrant rights and LGBTQ rights, a spotlight
has been placed on the concepts of bias and discrimination.53 Our legal system

46. Id. at r. 8.4(g); see also AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 14.
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (citing Model Rule
1.2(b)); see also AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 14.
48. See Peter Geraghty, ABA Adopts New Anti-Discrimination Rule 8.4(g), YOUR ABA, (Sept. 2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/youraba/2016/september-2016/aba-adopts-antidiscrimination-rule-8-4-g—at-annual-meeting-in-.html (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also AMER. BAR
ASS’N, supra note 7, at 15.
50. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 15.
51. During the House of Delegates meeting to consider Resolution 109, Patricia Lee Refo, Chair
of the House of Delegates, announced that 69 salmon slips were submitted to the House of Delegates
in favor of Resolution 109, and no salmon slips were submitted in opposition. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra
note 22, at 23:15-23:35. A salmon slip is “[a] simple, salmon-colored form, indicating that [a member
of the House of Delegates] wish[es] to speak for or against a resolution.” AMER. BAR ASS’N, QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS FOR THE NEW MEMBERS OF THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2011).
52. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 22, at 26:21-26:32; see also Laird, supra note 31.
53. See e.g., Emma Brown, Yale Study Suggests Racial Bias Among Preschool Teachers, WASH. POST
(Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/09/27/yale-studysuggests-racial-bias-among-preschool-teachers/?utm_term=.bfaf2cc2b819; Susan Chira & Jonathan
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likewise faces scrutiny with claims of prevalent bias and discrimination – both in
the courtroom and within the make-up of the profession itself.
A. Bias in the Courtroom
On October 11, 2016, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argument
in the case of Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado54, which garnered media attention to racial
bias in jury deliberations.55 Peña-Rodriguez, a horse trainer at a racetrack in
Colorado, was arrested and charged with one felony count and three
misdemeanor counts of sexual assault or contact and harassment of two teenage
sisters, daughters of a jockey, who testified that he groped them in a restroom at a
barn.56 At trial, the prosecution’s case rested on the victims’ identification of PeñaRodriguez.57 The defense noted the short time the victims saw their attacker and
the suggestibility of the identification procedures as the victims identified PeñaRodriguez through the window of a police cruiser at night on the roadside where

Martin, After Success of Women’s March, a Question Remains: What’s Next?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/us/after-success-of-womens-march-a-question-remains-whatsnext.html; Alison Leigh Cowan, Some Same-Sex Couples Are Rushing to Say Their Vows. Just in Case . . .,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/fashion/weddings/same-sex-marriagegay-couples-donald-trump.html; Christine Hauser, Black Doctor Says Delta Flight Attendant Rejected Her;
Sought ‘Actual Physician,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/us/blackdoctor-says-delta-flight-attendant-brushed-her-aside-in-search-of-an-actual-physician.html?_r=0; Eric
Lichtblau, Hate Crimes Against American Muslims Most Since Post-9/11 Era, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/us/politics/hate-crimes-american-muslims-rise.html;
Adam
Liptak, Supreme Court to Rule in Transgender Access Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/us/politics/supreme-court-to-rule-in-transgender-accesscase.html; Wesley Lowery & Sarah Kaplan, Black Lives Matter: What’s Next, WASH. POST (July 22, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/07/22/blm-whatsnext/?utm_term=.1b9b3a4d22ce; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Matt Apuzzo, Justice
Department to Release Blistering Report of Racial Bias by Baltimore Police, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/us/justice-department-to-release-blistering-report-of-racialbias-by-baltimore-police.html; John A. Powell, Implicit Bias in The Presidential Debate, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-a-powell/implicit-bias-in-thepres_b_12226968.
html; Liz Robbins, Even Before Trump Acts on Immigration, New Yorkers Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/nyregion/new-york-protest-trump-immigration-orders.html;
Michael Schwitrz et al., The Scourge of Racial Bias in New York State’s Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/nyregion/new-york-state-prisons-inmates-racial-bias.html.
54. Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
55. See Jess Braven, Supreme Court Weighs Juror Racial Bias Against Candid Deliberations, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-weighs-juror-racial-bias-against-candiddeliberations-1476228224; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Weighs Bias and Secrecy in Jury Deliberations, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/us/politics/supreme-court-bias-jurydeliberations.html; Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Hears Case on Racial Bias in Jury Deliberations, NPR
(Oct. 11, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/11/497196091/top-court-hears-case-on-racial-bias-in-jurydeliberations; see also Turner v. Stime, 222 P.3d 1243, 1249 (Wash. App. 2009) (affirming the grant of a
new trial on the grounds that the jury had engaged in misconduct by making explicitly biased
comments about the Asian American attorney representing the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice suit).
56. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No.
15-606).
57. Id. at 3.
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he was detained.58 The defense also presented an alibi witness, who testified that
Peña-Rodriguez was with him in a different barn when the attack occurred.59
Though the jurors initially deadlocked, the judge sent them back into
deliberations, informing them that it was their duty to reach a verdict.60 After
twelve hours of deliberation, the jurors found Peña-Rodriguez guilty on the three
misdemeanor charges.61
After the verdict, defense counsel, consistent with the practice in Colorado
and other jurisdictions, spoke to two jurors who revealed that during deliberations
another juror expressed bias toward Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness because
they are Hispanic.62 With the trial judge’s permission, defense counsel procured
affidavits from the jurors, in which they alleged that Juror H.C. stated that he knew
the defendant was guilty “because he’s Mexican” and because in Juror H.C.’s
experience as an ex-policeman, “nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of
being aggressive toward women and young girls.”63 The jurors further alleged
that Juror H.C. stated that “the alibi witness [wasn’t] credible because, among
other things, he was ‘an illegal.’”64
During oral argument, Jeffrey Fisher, Peña-Rodriguez’s attorney, argued that
racial bias “is a stain on the entire judicial system and the integrity that it’s built
upon.”65 Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed, stating, “I always thought the most
pernicious and odious discrimination in our law is based on race.”66 Justice Elena
Kagan, referring to precedents concerning jury selection and race, said “there need
to be special rules to address this prevalent and toxic problem in our criminal
justice system. . . .”67
Justice Kagan’s comments68 appear to refer in part to Foster v. Chatman69, a
case term in which the Supreme Court in a 7-1 decision recently ruled in favor of
a death row inmate in a case concerning racial discrimination in jury selection.
Foster, a poor, black teenager with limited mental abilities was found guilty of
murder by an all-white jury and spent thirty years on death row.70 The State used
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 4-5.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Oral Argument Transcript at 14, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colo., No. 15-606,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15-606_5iel.pdf.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Id. at 44.
68. Id. (“[I]t seems there are two lines of cases which—in which we’ve recognized that racial bias
in a jury room is an especially important problem, and that there need to be special rules to address
that problem. And the first line of cases is the ones that on voir dire say that a lawyer who wants to ask
about racial bias on voir dire has to be able to ask about racial bias, and that we’ve applied to nothing
else except for racial bias. And the second is the Batson line of cases where we’ve said we’re going to
prevent lawyers from doing what we otherwise allow them to do when striking jurors will lead to—
may lead to race bias in the jury room.”).
69. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
70. Id. at 1743.
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peremptory challenges to strike all prospective black jurors.71 The Court held that
the State’s justifications were pre-textual—the reasons for striking two black jurors
had equally applied to non-black jurors, who were not struck, tending to provide
compelling evidence of “purposeful discrimination.”72 It further held that the
State’s arguments were contradicted by evidence in the record.73 A copy of the
prosecutors’ files contained, among other documents: (i) a venire list on which all
prospective black jurors’ names were highlighted with a legend indicating that
they “represent[ed] Blacks”; (ii) notes identifying prospective black jurors as “B#
1,” “B# 2,” etc., and with the notation “N” (for “no”) next to each name; (iii) a list
titled “definite NO’s” containing six names, including all five prospective black
jurors; (iv) a document entitled “Church of Christ” with a notation that read “NO.
No Black Church”; and (v) jury questionnaires by the prospective black jurors on
which their race had been circled.74
“[T]he shifting explanations, the
misrepresentations of the record, and the persistent focus on race in the
prosecution’s file” established that the strikes of the prospective black jurors “were
motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.”75
But the issue of bias in jury selection has not only arisen with respect to race
or ethnicity or in the context of the criminal justice system. In SmithKline Beecham
Corporation v. Abbott Laboratories, for example, the Ninth Circuit recently held in an
antitrust action involving the licensing and pricing of HIV medications that
peremptory strikes on the basis of sexual orientation during jury selection violate
equal protection.76 During jury selection, Abbott Laboratories used its first
peremptory strike against the only self-identified gay prospective member of the
jury.77 The prospective juror referred to his partner three times by the masculine
pronoun “he” during voir dire and revealed that he had friends with HIV.78
Abbott Laboratories’ counsel briefly asked the prospective juror five questions
about the drug at issue, but did not ask any questions as to whether he could
decide the case fairly and impartially.79 Abbott Laboratories’ counsel did not
provide any justification for his strike when given the opportunity, which
provided a strong inference of intentional discrimination, and his subsequent
justification was found by the court to not be supported by the record and not
credible.80

71. Id.
72. Id. at 1754.
73. Id. at 1755.
74. Id. at 1743–44.
75. Id. at 1754 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014); see also J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (holding in a paternity and child support action that equal
protection forbids intentional discrimination on the basis of gender, particularly where “the
discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overboard stereotypes about the
relative abilities of men and women.”).
77. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 474.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 474–75.
80. Id. at 477–78.
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The above examples illustrate explicit bias in the courtroom; but studies and
recent cases reveal that our courtroom is likewise rife with implicit bias.81
Leveraging the Implicit Association Test methodology created by Project Implicit,
a non-profit organization founded in 1998 by three scientists interested in implicit
social cognition,82 researchers tested whether law students harbor implicit gender
biases related to legal careers and to leadership positions in the legal setting.83 The
study found that law students hold implicit associations correlating men and
judges and women and paralegals as well as associating men with the workplace
and women with the home and family.84 Studies further confirm gender bias
surrounding courtroom decorum, style and persona85; while others highlight
entrenched gender stereotypes, such as being mistaken for a secretary or paralegal,
81. “[I]mplicit bias is grounded in a basic human tendency to divide the social world into groups.
In other words, what may appear as an example of tacit racism may actually be a manifestation of a
broader propensity to think in terms of ‘us versus them’ — a prejudice that can apply, say, to fans of a
different sports team.” Daniel A. Yudkin & Jay Van Bavel, The Roots of Implicit Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/opinion/sunday/the-roots-of-implicit-bias.html; see also
Saleem Reshamwala, Who, Me? Biased?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
/video/who-me-biased (describing implicit bias in our society and strategies to de-bias).
82. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998); PROJECT IMPLICIT,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (offering thirteen implicit association
tests on topics such as race, weight, disability, gender, skin-tone, sexuality, mental health and even
presidential candidates).
83. Justin P. Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession: An Empirical
Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLICY 1, 3–4 (2010).
84. Id. at 28–29; see also Ed Yong, 6-Year-Old Girls Already Have Gendered Beliefs About Intelligence,
THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/01/six-year-old-girlsalready-have-gendered-beliefs-about-intelligence/514340/?utm_source=fbia (revealing the results of a
study in which Lin Bian, a University of Illinois psychologist, read a story to children aged five to seven
about a person who is “really, really smart” and then asked the children to match pictures of four
unfamiliar adults—two men and two women—to attributes such as “smart” or “nice” and noting that
“[t]he stereotypes that brilliance and genius are male traits is common among adults. In various
surveys, men rate their intelligence more favorably than women, and in a recent study of biology
undergraduates, men overrated the abilities of male students above equally talented and outspoken
women. But Bian’s study shows that the seeds of this pernicious bias are planted at a very early age.
Even by the age of 6, boys and girls are already diverging in who they think is smart.”).
85. See DEF. RESEARCH INST., A CAREER IN THE COURTROOM: A DIFFERENT MODEL FOR THE SUCCESS
OF WOMEN WHO TRY CASES, 10–11 (2004) (revealing in a survey of the judiciary that several judges
viewed women who raised their voice in the courtroom as “shrill,” while men were viewed as simply
being aggressive, and noting that judges identified one of their biggest challenges was dealing with
entrenched biases against women when they exhibit aggressive behavior); Peter W. Hahn & Susan D.
Clayton, The Effects of Attorney Presentation Style, Attorney Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20
LAW & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 533, 549 (1996) (examining the effects of aggressive versus passive speech
and finding that women were less successful than men when adopting an aggressive demeanor in
securing a “not guilty” verdict from mock jurors for their client); see also Deborah L. Rhode & Barbara
Kellerman, Women and Leadership: The State of Play, in WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP: THE STATE OF PLAY AND
STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 1 (Barbara Kellerman & Deborah L. Rhodes eds., 2006) (noting that female
litigators must strike a balance between societal stereotypes regarding feminine and masculine traits
in order to be perceived favorably in the courtroom; for example, if she is soft-spoken and
compassionate, she may be perceived as weak, but if she is too forceful or aggressive, she may be
labeled as abrasive).
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being called a “term of endearment,” or being treated in a condescending
manner.86
With respect to implicit bias on the basis of race or ethnicity, another study
revealed that potential jurors implicitly associate white males with traits
commonly used to depict successful litigators, such as eloquent, charismatic, and
verbal.87 The study examined whether bias (explicit or implicit) in favor of white
lawyers and against Asian American lawyers would alter how people evaluate
identical lawyering, simply because of the race or ethnicity of the lawyer.88 The
researchers intentionally did not examine the effect of race or ethnicity for women
attorneys, noting:
Our strategy was not to ignore gender, but to control for it, based on past evidence
showing that lawyers are expected to be men rather than women . . . . As such, we
expected that implicit and explicit stereotypes about ideal lawyers would activate
thoughts of White men more than Asian men, but would not much activate
thoughts of women of either race.89

Relatedly, the Court of Appeals of Idaho recently held that a prosecutorial
remark with implicit racial overtones improperly infused race into a criminal trial,
violating the defendant’s constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection.90 In State v. Kirk, four white juvenile females ran away from a group
home and encountered James D. Kirk, an African-American male, outside of a
motel.91 Kirk invited the girls to spend the night there.92 Later the next day, when

86. See DEF. RESEARCH INST., supra note 85, at 10–11 (reporting that 70.4 percent of survey
participants experienced gender bias in the courtroom); Bibianne Fell, Gender in the Courtroom: Part 1 –
Is Lady Justice at a Disadvantage in the Courtroom?, NAT’L INST. FOR TRIAL ADVOC.: THE LEGAL ADVOCATE
(Mar. 19, 2013), http://blog.nita.org/2013/03/gender-in-the-courtroom-part-1-is-lady-justice-at-adisadvantage-in-the-courtroom/ (highlighting a 2005 survey by the State Bar of California Center for
Access and Fairness that found that 54 percent of participating female attorneys in California reported
experiencing gender bias in the courtroom and a 2004 survey by the Texas State Bar reporting that nine
out of ten participating female attorneys report being the target of at least one incident of gender
discrimination in the courtroom); see also Kat McFarlane, Motion to Dismiss: From Catcalls to Kisses,
Gender Bias in the Courtroom, OBSERVER (Jul. 10, 2013), http://observer.com/2013/07/women-lawyerssexism-nyc/ (“My adversaries, civil rights attorneys representing plaintiffs in federal court, were
overwhelmingly male, and they loved to yell at me, both over the phone and in person. When they
didn’t like my strategy, they called my motions ‘stupid.’ When I made a cogent argument that I refused
to back down from, I was ‘too sensitive.’”); Elizabeth Olson, Bar Association Considers Striking “Honeys”
From the Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 5, 2016) at B1, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/05/
business/dealbook/sexual-harassment-ban-is-on-the-abas-docket.html (“When Lori Rifkin asked the
opposing lawyer to stop interrupting her while she questioned a potential witness, he replied: ‘Don’t
raise your voice at me. It’s not becoming of a woman.’ The remark drew a rebuke and [a $250] fine in
January [2016] from a federal magistrate who declared that the lawyer had ‘endorsed the stereotype
that women are subject to a different standard of behavior than their fellow attorneys.’”).
87. Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal Litigators White? Measuring the Myths of Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 886, 902 (2010).
88. Id. at 912.
89. Id. at 893 (internal citations omitted).
90. State v. Kirk, 339 P.3d 1213, 1219 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014).
91. Id. at 1214.
92. Id.
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two of the girls were apprehended by police, they told police that they had had
sex with Kirk.93 When the other two girls turned themselves in to police a few
days later, they stated that they observed Kirk and the two girls having sex.94
When Kirk was arrested, he admitted that the girls had been in his motel room,
but denied any sexual conduct.95 Kirk was charged with lewd conduct with and
sexual battery of a minor child.96 At trial, the prosecution’s case relied primarily
on the girls’ testimony.97 As such, during closing argument, defense counsel
focused on the weaknesses of the State’s case, namely the lack of physical evidence
corroborating the girls’ testimony.98 In her rebuttal closing argument, the
prosecutor sang or recited the lines from “Dixie,” stating:
Ladies and gentleman, when I was a kid we used to like to sing songs a lot. I
always think of this one song. Some people know it. It’s the Dixie song. Right?
Oh, I wish I was in the land of cotton. Good times not forgotten. Look away. Look
away. Look away. And isn’t that really what you’ve kind of been asked to do?
Look away from the two eyewitnesses. Look away from the two victims. Look
away from the nurse in her medical opinion. Look away. Look away. Look
away.99

Defense counsel did not object, and the jury found Kirk guilty on both
charges.100 On appeal, the court noted that “‘Dixie’ was an anthem of the
Confederacy, an ode to the Old South, which references with praise a time and
place of the most pernicious racism.”101 While the court agreed that the
prosecutor’s comment may have been innocently made and not intended to appeal
to racial bias, the court stated that “a prosecutor’s mental state, however innocent,
does not determine the message received by the jurors or their individual
responses to it. An invocation of race by a prosecutor, even if subtle and oblique, may
be violative of due process or equal protection.”102

93. Id. at 1214–15.
94. Id. at 1215.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1216.
102. Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 556–58 (Wash. 2011) (finding
constitutional infringement where the prosecutor appealed to racial stereotypes or racial bias by
pronouncing several times “police” as “po-leese” while conducting examination of African-American
witnesses and suggesting that there existed an anti-snitch code among African-Americans); State v.
Cabrera, 700 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Minn. 2005) (finding that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
wrongfully accusing defense counsel of asserting a racist defense, stating “[a]ffirming this conviction
would undermine our strong commitment to rooting out bias, no matter how subtle, indirect, or
veiled.”).
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In February 2017, in another high profile case,103 the Supreme Court, in an
opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, overturned a death-penalty
sentence after an expert witness testified that the defendant was likely to commit
future crimes because of the color of his skin.104 During the sentencing phase of a
capital murder case, Duane Buck’s attorney called Dr. Walter Quijano, a
psychologist appointed by the presiding judge to conduct a psychological
evaluation of Buck, to elaborate on the seven “statistical factors”—one of which
was “race”—he evaluated to determine whether Buck was likely to commit acts of
violence in the future.105 Dr. Quijano’s report read, in relevant part: “4. Race.
Black: Increased probability. There is an overrepresentation of Blacks among the
violent offenders.”106 Despite knowing Dr. Quijano’s views regarding a
correlation between Buck’s race and an increased probability of future violence,
Buck’s attorney successfully admitted Dr. Quijano’s report into evidence.107
During cross-examination, the prosecutor likewise focused on the report,
questioning Dr. Quijano about his statistical factors of sex and race: “‘You have
determined that the sex factor, that a male is more violent than a female because
that’s just the way it is, and that the race factor, black, increases the future
dangerousness for various complicated reasons; is that correct?’ Dr. Quijano
replied, ‘Yes.’”108 During closing argument, the prosecution stressed this point,
stating, “You heard from Dr. Quijano, . . . who told you that . . . the probability did
exist that [Buck] would be a continuing threat to society.”109 After two days of
deliberations and after requesting to view the “psychology reports” admitted into
evidence, the jury returned a sentence of death.110
On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that “Dr. Quijano took the stand as a
medical expert bearing the court’s imprimatur” and rendered an opinion that
“coincided precisely with a particularly noxious strain of racial prejudice, which
itself coincided precisely with the central question at sentencing”— would Buck
commit terrible acts of violence again?111 In answering that question, the jury was
asked to engage in a speculative inquiry, and Dr. Quijano appeared to present
“hard statistical evidence” to guide their answer.112
But one thing would never change: the color of Buck’s skin. Buck would always
be black. And according to Dr. Quijano, that immutable characteristic carried with

103. Matt Ford, ‘Some Toxins Can Be Deadly in Small Doses,’ THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2017)
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/supreme-court-duane-buck/517542/;
Adam
Liptak, Citing Racist Testimony, Justices Call for New Sentencing in a Death Penalty Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
23, 2017; David Savage, Supreme Court Rejects Use of ‘Racial Stereotypes’ in Death Penalty Cases, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essential-washington-updatessupreme-court-rejects-use-of-racial-1487777756-htmlstory.html.
104. Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 767 (2017).
105. Id. at 768.
106. Id. (emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 768–69.
108. Id. (internal citations omitted).
109. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 776–77.
112. Id. at 776.
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it an “[i]ncreased probability” of future violence. . . . And it was potent evidence.
Dr. Quijano’s testimony appealed to a powerful racial stereotype—that of black
men as “violence prone.”113

In holding that Buck demonstrated both ineffective assistance of counsel and
entitlement to a reopening of the judgment, the Court noted that “Dr. Quijano’s
report said, in effect, that the color of Buck’s skin made him more deserving of
execution,” and “[n]o competent defense attorney would introduce such evidence
about his own client.”114 Moreover, in acknowledging the dangers of implicit bias
in the judicial system, the Court stated that “[i]t would be patently
unconstitutional for a state to argue that a defendant is liable to be a future danger
because of his race.”115
B. Bias in the Legal Profession
As Wendi S. Lazar, Chair of the ABA Commission on Women in the
Profession, stated during her presentation on Resolution 109 before the House of
Delegates:
[In] our profession, our record [of supporting women and minorities] is . . .
abysmal. We have few women equity partners, and fewer minority partners. And
in terms of diversity and inclusion, our record is poor. We are losing the war on
retention, allowing women and minorities to leave the profession because they feel
unprotected and undervalued.116

Despite the fact that women have comprised almost half of the law school
graduating class for approximately 20 years,117 women currently represent only 36
percent of the legal profession.118 Relatedly, within private practice law firms, “the
representation of women, after making steady incremental progress postrecession, has essentially stalled. . . .”119 In 2015, though women comprised 48
percent of law firm summer associate classes, the percentage of women among the
associate ranks now sits at roughly 45 percent, the lowest level since 2006.120
Though a small gain over prior years, women now represent just over 21 percent
113.
114.
115.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 775.
Id.; see also Arusha Gordon, Sentenced to Death for Being Black? A Look at Buck v. Davis,
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.afj.org/blog/sentenced-to-death-for-being-black-alook-at-buck-v-davis (noting that the amicus brief filed by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law and international law firm Jones Day in support of Buck “provides a summary of research
on implicit bias and argues that unconscious stereotypes can be brought to the fore by exposure to
racially-tinged triggers, a process known as ‘priming.’ In addition, the brief argues that, because we
are psychologically geared to give greater credence to authority figures, implicit biases and priming
have a particularly profound impact when invoked by an expert witness.”).
116. House of Delegates: Rule Against Harassment and Discrimination, supra note 22, at 18:24-18:50.
117. NALP Diversity Infographic: Women, NALP (citing NALP, 2015-2016 NALP DIRECTORY OF
LEGAL EMPLOYERS (2016)), http://www.nalp.org/nalpdiversityinfographic_women (last visited Feb. 25,
2017).
118. AMER. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS YEAR 2016 (2016) (citing AMER. BAR ASS’N, 2016
NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY (2016)).
119. NALP Diversity Infographic: Women, supra note 117.
120. Id.
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of law firm partners.121 Similarly, women represent just shy of 25 percent of
general counsels at Fortune 500 companies.122 Among non-equity law firm
partners, women represent almost 29 percent; however, only 17.4 percent of equity
partners are women,123 and women represent only roughly 5.5 percent of law firm
managing partners in the AmLaw 200, the largest law firms in the country.124
According to the National Association of Women Lawyers’ (NAWL) Ninth
Annual Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms:
Men continue to be promoted to non-equity partner status in significantly higher
numbers than women. Among the non-equity partners who graduated from law
school in 2004 and later, 38 percent were women and 62 percent were men. This
data remain vexing in light of the longstanding pipeline of women, as women have
been graduating from law school in nearly equal numbers for decades.125

Moreover, the gender gap at the leadership levels is striking. “[R]oughly one
in five firms still has no woman on their top governing committee.”126 And, of
those firms with female representation on their governance committees, women
typically comprise only 22 percent of committee members.127
“At the root of retention and advancement disparities, say experts, is the
subtle bias that plays out in compensation decisions.”128 And, it appears that for
women the compensation gender gap is widening. In response to NAWL’s Ninth
Annual Survey, not a single responding law firm reported having a woman as its
highest earner.129 Rather, the data reflects that female equity partners typically
earn 80 percent of what their male counterparts earn130 and that men continue to

121. Id.; see also Julie Triedman, A Few Good Women, AM. LAWYER, Jun. 2015, at 41 (“As more firms
expand their nonequity tier, women appear to be getting stuck in what some people call a ‘pink ghetto.’
That’s a major problem: On average, nonequity or income partners may expect to make a third what
their equity-tier peers are earning; leadership positions are generally not within their grasp.”).
122. See Lydia Lum, Breaking Barriers, One Person at a Time: MCCA’s 17th Annual General Counsel
Survey, DIVERSITY & THE BAR, Nov./Dec. 2016, at 21 (highlighting the increase of four female general
counsels over the prior year and noting that Jean Lee, MCCA’s president and CEO “considers any
growth–even at a modest pace–positive, but pointed out that because women make up more than onethird of the legal profession, there should be no shortage of female job candidates”).
123. NALP Diversity Infographic: Women, supra note 117.
124. Triedman, supra note 121, at 46; see also Lauren Stiller Rikleen, Women Lawyers Continue to Lag
Behind Male Colleagues: Report of the Ninth Annual NAWL National Survey on Retention and Promotion of
Women in Law Firms, NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, at 10 (2015) (“Of the 25 firms that reported
having a single managing partner, 82 percent were men and only 18 percent were women.”); Jake
Simpson, Only 12 BigLaw Firms Have Women Running the Show, LAW360, Apr. 21, 2015,
http://www.law360.com/articles/645840/only-12-biglaw-firms-have-women-running-the-show (“Of
the 143 firmwide chair and managing partner positions at the top 100 firms in the Law360 400, only 15
are held by women.”).
125. NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 3.
126. Triedman, supra note 121, at 38.
127. NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 10.
128. Triedman, supra note 121, at 41.
129. NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 3.
130. Id. at 3; see also Triedman, supra note 121, at 41 (“[A]ccording to a survey of more than 2,000
large law firm partners last year by Major, Lindsey & Africa, compensation for male partners was 32
percent higher than that of their female colleagues.”).
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outpace women in client origination or rainmaking credit131 and billable rates.132
Furthermore, as articulated in an empirical study of the participation of women as
lead counsel and trial attorneys in civil and criminal litigation, “women are
consistently underrepresented in lead counsel positions and in the role of trial
attorney for all but a few types of cases.”133
The statistics are far worse when looking at racial and ethnic bias. According
to the 2010 Census, the most recent statistics on racial and ethnic demographics,
the legal profession is homogenous, with 88 percent of lawyers identifying as
White, 5 percent identifying as Black, 4 percent as Hispanic, 3 percent as Asian
Pacific American and less than one percent identifying as all other races or
ethnicities.134
Despite the fact that minorities comprised almost 27 percent of law school
graduates in the class of 2014, minorities are less likely to be employed full-time
after graduation than non-minorities and the representation of minorities among
lawyers at large law firms in 2015 was less than 14 percent.135 On a positive note,
though, minority representation among the law firm summer associate ranks is
fairly favorable with minorities comprising 31 percent of summer associates in
2015. Minorities now comprise roughly 22 percent of associates at large law firms,
which is largely attributable to an increase in the number of lawyers of Asian
descent, who now make up nearly 11 percent of all law firm associates.136
Representation of African-American associates has declined steadily since 2010,
leading to associates of Hispanic origin to slightly outnumber African-American

131. NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 7–9 (noting that among the responding
law firms, 88 percent of the top ten earners were men and 12 percent were women); see also Jennifer
Smith, Female Lawyers Still Battle Gender Bias, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2014), http://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424052702303948104579537814028747376 (“[T]he problem often occurs . . . among
female partners who may bill thousands of hours a year but aren’t regarded as rainmakers—even if
their skill, time and energy has helped land a client or significantly expanded that relationship. ‘They
are not getting the credit for what they do,’ [Patricia K. Gillette] said, or opportunities to inherit big
clients, which at some firms she said ‘tend to get handed down to men.’”).
132. Smith, supra note 131 (“[F]emale law-firm partners continue to lag behind their male
counterparts when it comes to billing rates, commanding on average 10% less for their services,
according to a new analysis of $3.4 billion in legal work.”).
133. Michele Coleman Mayes, First Chairs at Trial: More Women Need Seats at the Table, AMER. BAR
FOUND. & AMER. BAR ASS’N COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., at 4 (2015); see id. at 13-14 (finding
that (i) “[i]n civil cases, men are three times more likely to appear in lead roles than women,” (ii)
“women are more likely to be lead counsel representing civil defendants rather than civil plaintiffs,”
and (iii) “only a minority of attorneys appearing in criminal cases are women,” and when they do
appear, “[w]omen lead counsel in criminal cases represent the government more than twice as often as
they represent criminal defendants”).
134. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 118 (citing 2010 U.S. CENSUS) (noting that the U.S. Census
considers “Hispanic” an ethnicity, and therefore, persons of Hispanic origin can be of any race).
135. NALP Diversity Infographic: Minorities, NALP (citing NALP, 2015-2016 NALP DIRECTORY OF
LEGAL EMPLOYERS (2016)), http://www.nalp.org/nalpdiversityinfographic_minorities (noting that of
the 31 percent of minority summer associates, “17 percent are minority women and 14 percent are
minority men”).
136. Id.
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associates at 4.28 percent.137 Minorities represent only 7.52 percent of large law
firm partners with minority women representing only 2.5 percent.138 Among nonequity law firm partners, minorities represent almost 9.5 percent; however, just
over 5.5 percent of equity partners are minorities.139
According to NAWL’s Ninth Annual Survey:
The typical firm has 105 white male equity partners and seven minority male
equity partners, and 20 white female equity partners and two minority female
equity partners. Women comprise only 24 percent of Hispanic equity partners, 33
percent of black equity partners, and 29 percent of Asian equity partners. So few
Native American and Asian Pacific equity partners were identified that the
median reported for both men and women was zero.140

Moreover, “minorities still represent a tiny percentage of Fortune 500
leaders.”141 According to the Minority Corporate Counsel Association’s 17th
Annual General Counsel Survey, minorities represent just over 11 percent of
general counsels, with women of color representing just 4.4 percent.142 “Women
of color are scarce every year in the MCCA General Counsel Survey. Typically, three
or fewer are newcomer GCs at Fortune® 500 employers, resulting in glaring
disparities between these women and their nonminority peers. Nothing indicates
the 5-to-1 gap in hiring, promotion and representation will disappear soon.”143
As a means of understanding bias and inequity in the workplace, the ABA
Commission on Women in the Profession, through its Women of Color Research
Initiative, surveyed more than 1,000 current and former Fortune 500 in-house
attorneys of both genders and all racial and ethnic backgrounds.144 The survey
responses confirmed that “female attorneys of color in the corporate sector face
many of the same issues and obstacles as their women of color counterparts in law
firms, including the negative impact of bias and stereotypes on their careers.”145
When asked to rate the level of bias they experienced in their careers, 26 percent
of respondents “[e]xperienced demeaning comments or other types of
harassment” on the basis of gender, while approximately 9 percent experienced
such behavior on the basis of race or ethnicity.146 Respondents reacted similarly to
questions on whether they (i) “[e]xperienced one or more forms of discrimination”
(26 percent on the basis of gender and 10 percent on the basis of race or ethnicity),

137. Id. (noting that Hispanic representation among law firm associate ranks has increased only by
one half of one percent since 2009).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 6.
141. Thomas Threlkeld, Measuring the Progress of the Nation’s Legal Leaders: MCCA’s 13th Annual
General Counsel Survey, DIVERSITY & THE BAR, Sept./Oct. 2012, at 30.
142. Lum, supra note 122, at 20 (noting that the roster of the 56 minority general counsel consists
of 34 men and 22 women, and is racially comprised of 28 African-Americans, 13 Hispanic Americans
and 15 Asian-Pacific Americans, one of whom is South Asian).
143. Id. at 16.
144. ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROF., VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN FORTUNE
500 LEGAL DEPARTMENTS VI (2012).
145. Id. at VII.
146. Id. at XI (Table I).
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(ii) were treated differently than their peers (24 percent on the basis of gender and
9 percent on the basis of race or ethnicity) and (iii) lacked access to informal or
formal networking opportunities (27 percent on the basis of gender and 9 percent
on the basis of race or ethnicity).147 With respect to opportunities for advancement,
19 percent of respondents noted that they were denied promotion or advancement
and/or missed out on desirable assignments on the basis of gender, while 7 percent
were denied an advancement opportunity and 6 percent failed to receive ideal
assignments on account of their race or ethnicity.148
Relatedly, in a study by a leadership consulting firm, sixty lawyers from
twenty-two law firms were shown the same research memorandum allegedly
from a third-year law student (in actuality, it was written with the help of five law
firm partners).149 Half of the lawyers were told that the memorandum was written
by an African-American male student, while the other half were informed that the
writer was a Caucasian male.150 When scoring the memorandum on a five point
scale, the lawyers awarded the Caucasian writer a score of 4.1, while the AfricanAmerican writer was awarded a score of 3.2.151 Moreover, when providing
comments, “[t]he white [student] was praised for his potential and good analytical
skills, while the black [student] was criticized as average at best and needing a lot
of work.”152
According to NALP, compared with the general population, our legal
profession boasts very few lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT) lawyers.
In 2014, NALP collected for the first time data on the sexual orientation of law
school graduates, garnering a 38 percent response rate.153 Of those self-reporting
their sexual orientation, only 4 percent identified as lesbian, gay or bisexual (the
number of law school graduates identifying as transgender was too nominal to
evaluate separately).154 “Of these graduates, more than half were male” and only
a fourth were lawyers of color.155 Within large law firms, 5 percent of the 2014

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Partners in Study Gave Legal Memo a Lower Rating When Told Author
Wasn’t White, ABA J. (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/hypothetical_
legal_memo_demonstrates_unconscious_biases.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Id.; see also Dolly Chugh et al., Professors Are Prejudiced, Too, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/opinion/sunday/professors-are-prejudiced-too.html (revealing
the results of a study through which identical emails, “written in impeccable English, varying only the
name of the student sender,” were sent to 6,500 randomly selected professors from 259 American
universities from a fictional prospective student seeking guidance about the university’s Ph.D.
program, and finding that by sending the messages “from students with names like Meredith Roberts,
Lamar Washington, Juanita Martinez, Raj Singh and Chang Huang, names that earlier research
participants consistently perceived as belonging to either a white, black, Hispanic, Indian or Chinese
student,” “[p]rofessors were more responsive to white male students than to female, black, Hispanic,
Indian or Chinese students in almost every discipline and across all types of universities”).
153. NALP Diversity Infographic: LGBT, NALP, http://www.nalp.org/nalpdiversityinfographic_lgbt
(citing NALP, 2015-2016 NALP DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS (2016)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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summer associate class identified as LGBT,156 and LGBT lawyers comprise only 2
percent of large law firm equity partners.157 At law firms of 100 or fewer attorneys,
LGBT representation in the partnership ranks has notably increased from 0.63
percent in 2009 to over 2 percent in 2015.158 However, within corporations,
representation of LGBT lawyers is unclear as the Minority Corporate Counsel
Association has yet to include LGBT individuals as part of its annual general
counsel survey.159
Similarly, less than 2 percent of law school graduates self-identified as having
a disability.160 Graduates with a disability are the least likely to be employed
following graduation as compared to men, women, minorities or graduates
identifying as lesbian, gay or bisexual.161 Within large law firms, individuals with
disabilities account for just over 0.39 percent of associates and 0.30 percent of
partners.162
III. THE REASONABLE CULTURALLY COMPETENT LAWYER
During the comment period for Resolution 109, the SCEPR received
substantial comment regarding the lack of a mens rea standard within the initially
proposed language.163 As a result, the SCEPR revised the final language of the
rule, making it professional misconduct if a lawyer engages in conduct that the
156. Id.
157. See NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, supra note 124, at 6 (“According to the data provided
by 56 firms, only 2 percent of female and 1 percent of male equity partners are LGBT.”); see also J. Dalton
Courson, Reality Check: Combating Implicit Bias, ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION LGBT LITIGATOR (Dec. 21,
2012),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/lgbt/articles/fall2012-1212-reality-checkcombating-implicit-bias.html (“Over the course of a career, the effects of implicit decision-making can
lead to significant, detrimental consequences for the careers of LGBT lawyers. For example, in a lawfirm setting, straight partners handing out choice assignments may subconsciously feel more
comfortable working with straight associates and thus seek their assistance first, leading to fewer
billable hours and less challenging work for LGBT lawyers. Because LGBT attorneys are less likely to
choose traditional, opposite-sex family arrangements, LGBT lawyers and their straight counterparts
can have social differences that might reinforce implicit biases in some settings. Or a referral source
may have a subconscious concern that an LGBT colleague might be perceived negatively by the client
or in a courtroom, and choose to pass the case along to a straight colleague.”).
158. NALP, supra note 153.
159. Lum, supra note 122, at 27 (noting existing efforts to expand the MCCA’s annual general
counsel survey in future years to include LGBT general counsel).
160. NALP Diversity Infographic: Disabilities, NALP, http://www.nalp.org/nalpdiversityinfo
graphic_disabilities (citing NALP, 2015-2016 NALP DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS (2016)); see also
Mark Hansen, Left Behind: ABA Says Make Disabilities Part of Diversity Mix on Federal Bench, ABA J. (Apr.
1, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine /article/left_behind_aba_says_make_disabilities_part_
of_diversity_mix_on_federal_ben (highlighting that ABA members who identify themselves as having
a disability dropped from 6.87 percent to 4.56 percent).
161. NALP Diversity Infographic: Disabilities, supra note 159; see also ABA COMM’N ON MENTAL AND
PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW, ABA DISABILITY STATISTICS REPORT 2 (2011) (noting that in a 2009 NALP
study law school graduates with disabilities reported earning a mean salary of $84,018 and a median
salary of $62,973, compared to a mean salary of $93,454 and a median salary of $72,000 for male and
female graduates of all races and ethnicities).
162. NALP Diversity Infographic: Disabilities, supra note 159.
163. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 7.
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lawyer “knows or reasonably should know” is discrimination or harassment.164
As both “knows” and “reasonably should know” are defined under Model Rule
1.0(f)165 and 1.0(j),166 respectively, the SCEPR, in making this revision, argued that
the rule now incorporates a subjective standard that requires ascertaining the
lawyer’s actual state of mind (“knows”) and an objective standard that “asks what
a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would have comprehended from the
circumstances presented” (“reasonably should know”).167
Despite the incredible strides made by virtue of Resolution 109, Model Rule
8.4(g) leaves open a critical issue with respect to implementation. The SCEPR
claims that the insertion of the mens rea standard “supports the rule’s focus on
conduct and resolves concerns of vagueness or uncertainty about what behavior
is expected of the lawyer.”168 But the rule does not answer whether lawyers are
obligated to become culturally competent or whether it is simply permissible for
lawyers to blind themselves to bias and prejudice present in our legal profession
to avoid being subject to disciplinary action. In other words, how culturally
competent is the “reasonable lawyer”?
A. The Reasonable Lawyer v. The Reasonable Victim
The “reasonable person” is one of the longest-established creations “among
the select group of personalities who inhabit our legal village and are available to
be called upon when a problem arises that needs to be solved objectively.”169 Its
application though is not without criticism and controversy.170 Throughout its
history, scholars and the courts have grappled with whether reasonableness
should be a normative or positive notion,171 whether the reasonable person should

164. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
165. Id. at r. 1.0(f) (defining “knows” as “denot[ing] actual knowledge of the fact in question” and
noting that “[a] person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances”).
166. Id. at r. 1.0(j) (defining “reasonably should know” “when used in reference to a lawyer [as]
denot[ing] that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in
question”).
167. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 7-8 (emphasis added) (noting the ample precedent for the
insertion of a mens rea standard, which is currently used in Model Rules 1.13(f), 2.3(b), 2.4(b), 3.6(a), 4.3
(twice) and 4.4(b)).
168. Id. at 8.
169. Helow v. Advoc. Gen. for Scot., SC 967, 968 (Scot. 2008); see also Robert S. Adler & Ellen R.
Peirce, The Legal, Ethical, and Social Implications of the “Reasonable Woman” Standard in Sexual Harassment
Cases, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 775 (1993) (“[T]he ‘reasonable person’ standard has long been accepted
by most courts as the correct measure for evaluating allegedly culpable conduct, most notably in
negligence cases.”).
170. See Michael Vitiello, Defining the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law: Fighting the Lernaean
Hydra, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1435, 1442-49 (2010) (discussing the controversial and complex nature
of court decisions as to whether the reasonable person takes on personal characteristics of the defendant
in criminal law cases); Adler & Peirce, supra note 168, at 775 (highlighting the controversy surrounding
the applicability of the reasonable person standard to sexual harassment cases).
171. See Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 NYU L. REV. 323, 324 (2012)
(evaluating whether the reasonable person should be “defined in accordance with a particular
normative ethical commitment, be it welfare maximization, equal freedom, ethic of care, and so forth,
or in accordance with an empirically observed practice or perception”).
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be imbued with the characteristics of the defendant in criminal cases or the
negligent party in civil cases,172 or whether reasonableness should be evaluated
through the perspective of the victim.173 With respect to evaluating the
“reasonable person” standard in the context of attorney discipline under Model
Rule 8.4(g), the author favors reasonableness as a positive notion–defining the
reasonable person “in accordance with an empirically observed practice or
perception”174–and is intrigued by the notion of imbuing characteristics of the
victim into the evaluation of reasonableness.
In Professors Robert S. Adler and Ellen R. Peirce’s analysis of the
development of the “reasonable woman” standard in connection with sexual
harassment cases, they highlighted a dilemma that is likewise prevalent in
determining whether an attorney has engaged in harassment or discrimination
under the rules of professional conduct. Following the Supreme Court’s decision
in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,175 which aimed to provide clarity surrounding
the appropriate standard of review for evaluating a “hostile environment” in
sexual harassment cases, courts were required to assess whether the allegedly
harassing conduct was “both unwelcome and so severe or pervasive that it altered
the plaintiff’s working environment.”176 The question arose, however, from whose
perspective—”that of the particular victim, a reasonable person undifferentiated
by sex, or a reasonable woman”?177 Just as with discrimination and harassment
governing attorney conduct, Professors Adler and Peirce noted, “[s]ome see it . . .
some won’t.”178
In answering the question, Professors Adler and Peirce point to policy
guidance issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
emphasizing that when undertaking the hostile environment analysis “the
harasser’s conduct should be evaluated from the objective standpoint of a
‘reasonable person’” and that “Title VII should not serve as a ‘vehicle for
vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hypersensitive.’”179 The EEOC noted

172. See Vitiello, supra note 169, at 1447 (arguing that in self-defense cases “courts have not reached
consistent positions on drawing the line when faced with a request for an instruction that
individualizes the reasonable person”); but see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 242 (“But the heredity,
intelligence or temperament of the actor would not be held material in judging negligence, and could
not be without depriving the criterion of all its objectivity.”).
173. See Adler & Peirce, supra note 168, at 776 (“While a number of courts adhere to the traditional
‘reasonable person’ standard, others modify the reasonable person standard through a two-step
‘subjective/objective’ approach that explicitly considers the perspective both of the victim and of a
reasonable person.”).
174. Miller & Perry, supra note 170, at 324.
175. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-68 (1986).
176. Adler & Peirce, supra note 168, at 773-74.
177. Id. at 774.
178. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also id. at 775 (“A male supervisor
might believe, for example, that it is legitimate for him to tell a female subordinate that she has a ‘great
figure’ or ‘nice legs.’ The female subordinate, however, may find such comments offensive. Such a
situation presents a dilemma for both the man and the woman: the man may not realize that his
comments are offensive, and the woman may be fearful of criticizing her supervisor.”) (citing Lipsett v.
Uniy. of Puerto Rico, 842 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988)).
179. Id. at 774 (quoting U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Policy Guidance on Current Issues
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though that the reasonable person standard should take into consideration “the
victim’s perspective and not stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior.”180 In line
with this guidance and as a result of research suggesting that men and women
differ in their judgments of what particular behavior and comments constitute
sexual harassment, courts across the country have concluded that the differing
social experiences of men and women warrant the application of a “reasonable
woman” standard in sexual harassment cases.181
In advocating for the “reasonable women” standard in sexual harassment
cases, Professors Adler and Peirce acknowledge a few concerns that are relevant
to whether a similar standard should apply to attorney discipline cases. First, as
with Model Rule 8.4(g), Title VII bars discriminatory behavior based not only on
sex, but on other enumerated protected classifications. Professors Adler and
Peirce therefore posed the question: “If the courts are to apply a ‘reasonable
woman’ standard in sexual harassment cases, does this suggest that a ‘reasonable
victim’ standard will apply in other hostile environment cases?”182 Professors
Adler and Peirce saw no basis for refusing to extend the standard to cases
involving other protected classes under Title VII.183 And, from a perspective of
fairness and consistency, it is only appropriate that courts adopt a similar standard
in cases involving, for example, race, sexual orientation, national origin, disability
and religion.
However, doing so raises other concerns regarding corporate compliance and
individual fairness. As Professors Adler and Peirce note, “[t]ailoring the
workplace to avoid offending ‘reasonable Haitians,’ ‘reasonable blacks,’
‘reasonable Asians,’ reasonable Rastafarians,’ ‘reasonable Muslims,’ as well as
‘reasonable women,’ may prove to be an insuperable task.”184 Moreover, as
articulated in the sexual harassment context, “[t]he adoption of a ‘sex-specific’
standard raises . . . [the question] of whether it is fair to hold males to a standard
that, because they are males, they may be unable to appreciate or understand
fully.”185
B. A Middle Ground
Under the traditional “reasonable person” standard, when evaluating
attorney discipline cases under Model Rule 8.4(g), it is the author’s contention that

of Sexual Harassment, N-915-050 (BNA) 89 (Mar. 19, 1990)).
180. Id.
181. See Adler & Peirce, supra note 168, at 777 n.23; Jacquelynne M. Jordan, Little Red Reasonable
Woman and the Big Bad Bully: Expansion of Title VII and the Larger Problem of Workplace Abuse, 13 WM. &
MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 621, 630-31 (2007); Elizabeth L. Shoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person versus
Reasonable Woman: Does It Matter?, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 633, 634-38 (2002).
182. Adler & Peirce, supra note 168, at 822-23.
183. Id. at 823 (referencing the extension by the court in Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509
(D. Me. 1991), vacated in part for other reasons, 765 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991), in its adoption of the
“reasonable black person” in determining whether a hostile environment existed in a racial
discrimination case).
184. Id. at 823-24.
185. Id. at 777.
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we will fall prey to the concerns raised by the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady.186
In its rejection of the “reasonable person” standard in favor of the “reasonable
woman” standard, the Ninth Circuit stated that “a sex-blind reasonable person
standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the
experiences of women.”187 As noted above, our legal profession is homogenous,
dominated by Caucasian, straight, financially-stable, fully-abled men. As a result,
when evaluating whether an attorney has run afoul of the protections established
under Model Rule 8.4(g), it is not unreasonable to assume that individual biases
may creep into those decisions or that those decisions may be colored by the
“stereotyped notions of acceptable behavior” noted by the EEOC.
On the flip side, and from a practical perspective, it appears untenable to
apply a “reasonable victim” standard when evaluating the potential
discriminatory or harassing behavior of attorneys. Practically speaking, concerns
regarding the stifling of free speech, quelling of open debate and forcing of
political correctness are not unfounded. These concerns harken back to concerns
addressed by the EEOC and the courts regarding hypersensitive victims.
But, as noted above, bias and discrimination are prevalent in our judicial
system and legal profession. And, as discussed in further detail below, attorneys
are rarely disciplined for discriminatory behavior, unless such behavior is clearly
blatant. So, is there some middle ground?
As a profession, we are no strangers to being held to a higher standard of
ethics, morality and integrity as compared to the layperson and other professions.
“Lawyers have a unique position in society as professionals responsible for
making our society better. Our rules of professional conduct require more than
mere compliance with the law. Because of our unique position as licensed
professionals and the power that it brings, we are the standard by which all should
aspire.”188
Given the unique privilege and power of our legal profession, it is incumbent
upon us to take strides to be culturally aware and mindful in the practice of law.
As evidenced by the statistical and anecdotal information on bias in the profession,
it should no longer be acceptable for lawyers to turn a blind eye and insulate
themselves from the obligation to eliminate, as much as feasible, bias,
discrimination and prejudice from our legal profession. As such, when evaluating
complaints filed under Model Rule 8.4(g) or equivalent state rules, rather than
applying a traditional “reasonable lawyer” standard or imbuing the myriad of
individual characteristics into a reasonableness analysis under a “reasonable
victim” standard, bar counsel and the courts should apply a “reasonable culturally
competent lawyer” standard.
Under a “reasonable victim” standard, it is understandably challenging for
lawyers to understand the various topics, comments or conduct that may be
offensive to each protected category of person. But by applying an overlay of
cultural competence, we remove the concerns that disciplinary actions are viewed
through the lens of the homogeneous makeup of our profession.189 At the same
186.
187.
188.
189.

Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 879.
Transcript of American Bar Association Public Hearing, supra note 4, at 5-6.
Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary
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time, we also remove the concerns that lawyers are expected to understand all
facets of all cultures and social groups or be subject to disciplinary action. As such,
when evaluating whether conduct or comment by an attorney rises to the level of
discrimination or harassment under the rules of professional conduct, the
“reasonable culturally competent lawyer” standard offers a more balanced
approach.
In applying this standard, the question arises as to what characteristics
compose the reasonable culturally competent lawyer. As with the application of
the reasonableness standard across all aspects of the law, those admittedly difficult
decisions shall be left to the wisdom of bar counsel and the courts. However, as a
means of addressing arguments of unfairness in applying the proposed
“reasonable culturally competent lawyer” standard (i.e., concerns that behavior
considered to be innocent by reasonable homogenous lawyers may now give rise
to disciplinary action), it is critical, as discussed further below, that we make
cultural competency a core aspect of our legal education and practice.
IV. IS THE INSTITUTION OF A RULE ENOUGH?
Despite concerns about the perfectness or eloquence of the language of the
rule190, as a means of fulfilling our obligations as a profession to eliminate bias and
discrimination in the judicial system, it is critically important that states adopt
Model Rule 8.4(g) or modify their existing rules of professional conduct to comport
with the prominence and breadth of the Model Rule. It is the author’s contention
though, that merely adopting Model Rule 8.4(g) is not sufficient to rid our legal
profession (as much as is practicable) of bias and discrimination.
The history of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct is illustrative of this point.
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted by the House of Delegates on
August 7, 1990—just seven years after the first adoption of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.191 Canon 3B(5) originally required judges to perform their
duties “without bias or prejudice.”192 It also prohibited judges, in the course of
their judicial duties, or those subject to the judge’s direction from speaking or
behaving in a way that “manifest[s] bias or prejudice, including but not limited to
bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.”193 Canon 3B(6) also called upon

Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787-88 (1994) (articulating the construct of the “reasonable racist” in
the context of criminal law, noting: “For even if the ‘typical’ American believes that blacks’ ‘propensity’
toward violence justifies a quicker and more forceful response when a suspected assailant is black, this
fact is legally significant only if the law defines reasonable beliefs as typical beliefs. The reasonableness
inquiry, however, extends beyond typicality to consider the social interests implicated in a given
situation. Hence not all ‘typical’ beliefs are per se reasonable”).
190. Andrew Strickler, ABA Bias Rule Push Begins Amid Signs of Resistance, LAW360 (Oct. 11, 2016),
http://www.law360.com/articles/849450?sidebar=true (highlighting Dane Ciolino’s, a professor at
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law, criticisms of Model Rule 8.4(g) on the grounds of “just
odd rule drafting” and “sloppy draftsmanship” as reasons states will be slow to adopt the rule).
191. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990).
192. Id. at Canon 3B(5).
193. Id.
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judges to require lawyers to refrain from this behavior in “proceedings before the
judge.”194
In 2007, the House of Delegates overhauled the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, creating Rule 2.3 entitled “Bias, Prejudice and Harassment.”195 This rule
incorporated the prior language under the 1990 Model Code concerning bias and
discrimination with a few distinct revisions. It retained the requirement that
judges must perform their duties “without bias or prejudice,” but clarified that this
requirement extended to a judge’s “administrative duties.”196 It also retained the
provision prohibiting judges, and those subject to their direction, from
“manifest[ing] bias or prejudice,” including, but not limited to, bias or prejudice
on the basis of an illustrative list of protected classes.197 But it also remedied a
significant flaw in Canon 3B(5) by incorporating to the black letter of the rule a
prohibition against harassment, which was previously relegated to a discussion in
the comments to the Model Code and limited to only sexual harassment.198 Rule
2.3 also expanded the illustrative list of protected classes to include gender,
ethnicity, marital status and political affiliation.199 Moreover, Rule 2.3 maintained
its call upon judges to require lawyers to refrain from bias, discrimination and
harassment; however, it included a subtle tweak to the language, clarifying that
such behavior shall be monitored in “proceedings before the court.”200
Despite the excellent safeguards to bias, discrimination and harassment in the
language of the Model Code,201 recent studies show that “people [including
judges] can’t help but see the world through the lens of their own experiences.”202
194. Id. at Canon 3B(6).
195. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
196. Id. at r. 2.3(A).
197. Id. at r. 2.3(B).
198. Id.; see also ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, REPORT TO
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 49 (2006) (noting that “[t]he Commission agreed that harassment was a form
of bias or prejudice that the Rules proscribed but wanted to expand it beyond sexual harassment to
reach other forms of harassment as well”).
199. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010); see also ABA JOINT COMM’N TO
EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, supra note 197 (describing the Commission’s rationale
for adding four new illustrative protected classes).
200. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
201. See also id. at Canon 1 (“A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the, independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”); 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (“Each justice or judge of the
United States shall take the following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I,
___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do
equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform
all the duties incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help
me God.’”).
202. Jeff Guo, Researchers Have Discovered a New and Surprising Racial Bias in the Criminal Justice
System, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2016/02/24/researchers-have-discovered-a-surprising-racial-bias-in-the-criminal-justicesystem/?utm_term=.17afb7d6de30; see also Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy:
Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 314-15 (2012) (“[D]uring
the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the nomination of then-nominee, now-Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, Senator Jeff Sessions challenged her prior representations that she could be an impartial
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In 2012, two sociologists issued the results of their empirical analysis examining
“the issues of whether judges are, or can be, ‘impartial’ and whether empathy is
compatible with judicial reasoning.”203 Using a comprehensive dataset on federal
employment civil rights cases, the study found that federal judges with different
identity characteristics make systematically different decisions; namely, that even
when taking “into account pro se status—believing that the economic and legal
resources may influence the viability of a claim—white judges tend to dismiss
cases involving minority plaintiffs at a much higher rate than cases involving
white plaintiffs.”204 Based on another empirical study of federal workplace
harassment cases over a twenty-year period, white judges are half as likely as black
federal judges to rule in favor of people alleging racial harassment in the
workplace.205 Conversely, a 2016 study revealed the existence of negative in-group
bias (preferential treatment of one’s own group) in our judicial system leading to
harsher punishments toward group members.206 The study evaluated juvenile
court cases in Louisiana between 1996 and 2012, and found that, all else being
equal, black juveniles who are randomly assigned to black judges, and white
juveniles who are randomly assigned to white judges, are five percent more likely
to get incarcerated (as opposed to being placed on probation) and receive longer
sentences (approximately 14 percent longer).207
Additional studies similarly highlight ways in which bias and discrimination
creep into our judicial process.208 In 2014, three political scientists examined 4,519

judge by quoting remarks she made the day before: ‘You have repeatedly made this statement: ‘I accept
the proposition that a difference there will be by the presence of women and people of color on the
bench, and that my experiences affect the facts I choose to see as a judge.’’ Without hesitation,
Sotomayor responded, ‘the point that I was making was that our life experiences do permit us to see
some facts and understand them more easily than others.’”) (citing Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 84 (2009)).
203. Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 201, at 315; see also Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 816-21 (2001) (finding after surveying 167 federal magistrate judges that judges
were as susceptible to cognitive illusions that produce systemic errors in judgment as lay decision
makers).
204. Weinberg & Nielsen, supra note 201, at 346.
205. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial
Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1141 (2009); see also J. J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221 (2009) (concluding after completing
an implicit association test on race with 133 judges that judges, just like all other lay persons, showed
a moderate-to-large degree of implicit racial bias, which can potentially lead to racially disparate
decisions and outcomes).
206. Briggs Depew, Ozkan Eren and Naci Mocan, Judges, Juveniles and In-Group Bias, NAT’L BUREAU
OF ECON. RES. 4 (2016).
207. Id.
208. Relatedly, research from the University of Virginia School of Medicine and Sam Houston State
University has revealed that forensic psychologists and psychiatrists, who like judges are ethically
bound to be impartial when performing evaluations or providing expert opinions in court, may
actually be influenced by which party is issuing their paycheck. Bias in the Courtroom: Study Finds
Impartial Experts not so Impartial, UVA TODAY (Apr. 12, 2013), https://news.virginia.edu/content/biascourtroom-study-finds-impartial-experts-not-so-impartial (“In a real-world experiment, experts who
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votes in 516 First Amendment cases resolved by the Supreme Court from 1953 to
2010 to determine whether “justices defend the speech they hate.”209 Based on the
study’s findings, it appears they do so rarely. Rather, “Supreme Court justices are
opportunistic supporters of free speech. That is, liberal (conservative) justices are
supportive of free speech when the speaker is liberal (conservative).”210 In other
words, both liberal and conservative justices are more likely to vote in support of
a speaker if the speaker shares their ideology. In recognizing the importance of
the study, Erwin Chemerinsky, dean of the University of California, Irvine School
of Law, said, “[I]t offers an explanation for justices’ behavior in First Amendment
cases and shows how much justices’ ideology influences the speech they are
willing to protect.”211
A recent study by Professor Maya Sen of the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University revealed that on average black federal district
court judges have a roughly 10 percent greater likelihood of being reversed by the
federal appellate courts compared to the reversal rate for their white colleagues.212
Professor Sen analyzed the reversal rate for 1,054 federal district court judges from
2000 to 2012 and controlled for “previous professional and judicial experience,
educational background, qualification ratings assigned by the American Bar
Association, and differences in appellate panel composition.”213 Professor Sen
found that “[c]lose to 3,000 federal court decisions would have been upheld if
black judges were overturned” at the same rate as white judges.214 An explanation
for the study’s results is that “appeals panels somehow implicitly rely on the race
of the lower-court judge in reaching decisions.”215
In its study on bias in California Supreme Court cases, the State of California
Commission on Judicial Performance highlighted twenty-four instances from 1970
through 2011 in which a California Supreme Court judge was publically
admonished, reprimanded or removed from office for engaging in bias,
discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, ethnicity and/or national
origin.216 As an example, the study noted a 2011 case in which a judge was
publically admonished for remarking in open court in a criminal case involving
African-American defendants that “the only thing that would make the

believed they were working for prosecutors tended to conclude that sexually violent offenders were at
greater risk of re-offending than did experts who thought they were working for the defense.”).;
209. Lee Epstein et al., Do Justices Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the
First Amendment, 1, 7 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroup
Bias.pdf.
210. Id. at abstract.
211. Adam Liptak, For Justices, Free Speech Often Means ‘Speech I Agree With’, N.Y. TIMES (May 6,
2014), at A15, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/us/politics/in-justices-votes-free-speech-oftenmeans-speech-i-agree-with.html?_r=1.
212. Maya Sen, Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Reversal in US Courts, 44 J. OF LEGAL STUD. S187,
S188 (2015).
213. Id. at S187.
214. Id. at S221.
215. Id. at S217.
216. STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON JUD. PERFORMANCE, JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT INVOLVING BIAS:
ETHNICITY, NATIONALITY, RACE, GENDER AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 2–5 (2015).
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defendants plead was for him to come out in a white sheet and pointy hat.”217 The
study also outlined fifteen instances from 1973 through 2012 in which a California
Supreme Court judge was disciplined for engaging in sexual harassment or gender
bias,218 and two instances of bias based on sexual orientation, including a case in
which a judge chastised a minor’s parent in open court and in the presence of the
minor, blaming the parent’s sexual orientation as the cause of the minor’s
misbehavior.219
Similarly, several appellate courts have found bias by immigration law
judges on the basis of ethnicity or national origin. Such bias manifested in the
manner in which the judge treated the immigrant, for example, speaking “in an
argumentative, sarcastic, and sometimes arguably insulting manner, engag[ing] in
bullying until the petitioner was ground to bits, appear[ing] unseemly,
intemperate, and even mocking or [taking] on the role of a prosecutor anxious to
pick holes in the petitioner’s story.”220 So, notwithstanding almost thirty years of
our judiciary being governed by a model code with strong language to safeguard
against bias and discrimination, such behavior is still prevalent among our
judiciary.
When evaluating attorney discipline cases, it likewise appears that a mere
rule is not sufficient to bring about pronounced change. As noted above, twentyfive jurisdictions have already adopted into the black letter of their rules of
professional conduct provisions to protect against bias, discrimination and/or
harassment in the legal profession.221 Moreover, the rules of professional conduct
in thirteen jurisdictions have incorporated an anti-discrimination provision by
tracking the language under Model Rule 8.4(d) and its preexisting Comment 3.222
Though such jurisdictions are disciplining attorneys for discriminating and
harassing conduct,223 in comparison to the statistical and anecdotal information

217. Id. at 2.
218. Id. at 5–7.
219. Id. at 7.
220. Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 424 (2011)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also id. at 420–21 (highlighting examples of explicit
bias within the immigration court system where immigration law judges have been rebuked by
appellate courts for “launch[ing] into a diatribe against Chinese immigrants lying on the witness stand,
spanning twelve pages of transcript, telling an asylum applicant, the whole world does not revolve
around you and the other Indonesians that just want to live here because they enjoy the United States,
or, without any explanation, labeling asylum applicants as religious zealots whose exercise of religion
was offensive to a majority” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
221. See supra note 38.
222. See supra note 39.
223. See e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Moothart, 860 N.W.2d 598 (Iowa 2015)
(disciplining a lawyer for sexually harassing four female clients and one female employee); In re Kratz,
851 N.W.2d 219 (Wis. 2014) (disciplining a district attorney for sending over 25 texts of a sexual nature
to a victim of domestic violence); In re Griffith, 838 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. 2013) (disciplining a lawyer who,
while acting as an adjunct professor and supervising law students in a clinic, made sexual advances to
students); In re McGrath, 280 P.3d 1091 (Wash. 2012) (disciplining a lawyer for sending two ex parte
communications to the trial judge inquiring as to whether he was going to believe an alien (the
opposing party was Canadian) or a U.S. citizen (his client was his wife)).
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regarding bias and discrimination in the profession, they are doing so only in a
limited number of instances.
Unfortunately, a comprehensive analysis of the number of complaints filed
under the anti-discrimination and anti-harassment provisions in every state, and
if relevant, the resulting disciplinary action remains elusive. Many states do not
maintain public records of the complaints filed, but rather only publish the records
of those cases leading to disciplinary action.224 Relatedly, many states retain their
disciplinary records in a manner that is challenging to search – whether manually
due to paper filing systems or request procedures225 or electronically due to limited
search criteria or cumbersome search mechanisms via online portals.226
Regardless, the disciplinary records from several states prove instructive.
When evaluating attorney discipline records and cases in Illinois over the last ten
years,227 only three disciplinary actions and sanctions have been brought against

224. See e.g., Grievance Decisions by Name, STATE OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH,
https://www.jud.ct.gov/sgcdecisions/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (providing access only to disciplinary
decisions); but see, e.g., Annual Reports, MINN. LAWYERS PROF’L RESPON. BD., http://lprb.mncourts.
gov/AboutUs/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (providing links to annual reports
from 1999 to 2016 that include statistics on the number of complaints filed and closed each year).
225. In attempting to secure the disciplinary records pertaining to the anti-discrimination and/or
anti-harassment provisions in each state, Alabama, Alaska, Nevada, Rhode Island and South Dakota
do not retain their disciplinary records in an electronic format accessible to the public and therefore
require the submission of records requests, which often necessitate labor-intensive manual searches by
the relevant entity to locate the disciplinary actions responsive to the records requests.
226. See e.g., Orders and Opinions Regarding Final Resolution in Attorney Disciplinary Cases, JUD.
BRANCH OF IND., http://www.in.gov/judiciary/4730.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (requiring users to
search by year and then click on links for each decision issued that year to determine whether a decision
pertains to a particular disciplinary rule); MINN. LAWYERS PROF’L RESPON. BD., supra note 223
(providing links to annual reports from 1999 to 2016 that provide a limited overview of the disciplinary
process, including a chart of “Areas of Misconduct” that is challenging to decipher whether any “areas”
apply to disciplinary actions under the anti-discrimination and anti-harassment provisions articulated
in Rules 8.4(g) or (h) of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct); Public Orders Imposed Against
Nebraska Attorneys, STATE OF NEB. JUD. BRANCH, https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/attorney-sanctions
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (requiring users to search exclusively by the last name of the disciplined
Nebraska attorney); Disciplinary Quarterly Reports, THE DISCIPLINARY BD. OF THE N.M. SUP. CT.,
https://www.nmdisboard.org/QuarterlyReport.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (providing links to
quarterly reports from 2007 to 2016 that contain brief summaries of certain disciplinary actions, but no
easy mechanism for identifying cases that that violate this aspect of the rule); Annual Reports on the
Committee on Professional Discipline, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.nysba.org/copdannualreports/
(last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (providing links to annual professional discipline reports from 2002 to 2015
that provide only high level statistics of discipline cases with no information regarding the number of
cases violating a particular rule of conduct); OPC History of Annual Reports, UTAH STATE BAR,
http://www.utahbar.org/opc/opc-history-of-annual-reports/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2017) (providing links
to annual reports that provide a high level summary of the number of cases and disciplinary decisions,
but no relevant information regarding the number of cases violating a particular professional rule of
conduct).
227. When using the Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission’s online portal, the author
inputted the following separate search terms: (i) “8.4(j)”; (ii) “‘8.4(d)’ & ‘bias’”; (iii) “‘8.4(d)’ & ‘race’ OR
‘sex’ OR ‘religion’ OR ‘national origin’ OR ‘disability’ OR ‘age’ OR ‘sexual orientation’ OR
‘socioeconomic status’”; (iv) “‘8.4(a)(5) & ‘discriminatory’”; and (v) “8.4(a)(9)(A).” See Disciplinary
Reports and Decisions Search, SUP. CT. OF ILL., https://www.iardc.org/rd_database/rulesdecisions.html
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attorneys for discrimination or harassment under the current Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct 8.4(d) and 8.4(j) as well as their predecessors Illinois Rules
of Professional Conduct 8.4(a)(5) and 8.4(a)(9)(A).228 Similarly, within the last ten
years, only four Indiana attorneys have been subject to disciplinary action for
discriminatory conduct in violation Rule 8.4(g) of the Indiana Rules of Professional
Conduct.229 In Connecticut, only one attorney has been disciplined for violating
Rule 8.4(4) of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct.230 Moreover, not a

(last visited Feb. 25, 2017). Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) and its Comment 3 tracks the
language of Model Rule 8.4(d) and its preexisting Comment 3. ILL. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d),
cmt. 3 (2017). Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(j) makes it professional misconduct to:
[V]iolate a federal, state or local statute or ordinance that prohibits discrimination based on
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status
by conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer. Whether a
discriminatory act reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer shall be determined
after consideration of all the circumstances, including: the seriousness of the act; whether the
lawyer knew that the act was prohibited by statute or ordinance; whether the act was part of
a pattern of prohibited conduct; and whether the act was committed in connection with the
lawyer’s professional activities. No charge of professional misconduct may be brought
pursuant to this paragraph until a court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction
has found that the lawyer has engaged in an unlawful discriminatory act, and the finding of
the court or administrative agency has become final and enforceable and any right of judicial
review has been exhausted.
Id. at r. 8.4(j). Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(a)(5) and 8.4(a)(9)(A) were the predecessors to
Rules 8.4(d) and 8.4(j), which were adopted in 2009. See ILL. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a)(5),
8.4(a)(9)(A) (2008).
228. In re Contee Jones, Jr., M.R. 26769, 2014PR00045 (Ill. Att’y Registration and Disciplinary
Comm’n Sept. 12, 2014) (disbarring an attorney for sexually exploiting two associates, one legal
assistant and one assistant office manager employed by his law firm over whom he had supervisory
authority); In re Garnati, M.R. 26733, 2013PR00124 (Ill. Att’y Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n
Sept. 12, 2014) (disciplining a prosecutor for making improper and racially-based arguments during
the prosecution of a murder case where both the defendant and the victim were black); In re Hoffman,
No. 08 SH 65 (Ill. Att’y Registration and Disciplinary Comm’n Jun. 23, 2010) (disciplining an attorney
for making a derogatory comment to opposing counsel based on his religion).
229. In re Barker, 993 N.E.2d 1138 (Ind. 2013) (suspending an attorney for accusing a mother in a
dissolution action of being in the country illegally); In re Kelley, 925 N.E.2d 1279 (Ind. 2010) (publically
reprimanded an attorney for making gratuitous comments about a company representative’s sexual
orientation); In re McCarthy, 938 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 2010) (suspending an attorney for inappropriately
using the word “nigger” in an email to his client); In re Campiti, 937 N.E.2d 340 (Ind. 2009) (disciplining
a lawyer who at a child support modification hearing made disparaging references to the fact that the
mother was not a U.S. citizen). As noted above, see supra note 225, Indiana’s online portal requires
users to search by year and then click on individual links for each decision issued that year to determine
the nature of the disciplinary action. As such a methodology is time consuming and inefficient, the
author completed a Westlaw search to locate the above-referenced disciplinary actions under Rule
8.4(g). Rule 8.4(g) provides that it is professional misconduct for an Indiana lawyer to:
[E]ngage in conduct, in a professional capacity, manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or
prejudice based upon race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, sexual orientation,
age, socioeconomic status, or similar factors. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing
factors does not violate this subsection. A trial judge’s finding that preemptory challenges
were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this Rule.
IND. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2017).
230. In re Mayo, No. 08-0767 (Conn. Statewide Grievance Comm. Sept. 18, 2009) (disciplining an
attorney for failing to steer his practice away from the representation of women in domestic relations
matters to protect them from unwanted and inappropriate sexual advances). Rule 8.4(4) of the
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single attorney has been sanctioned for discrimination or harassment in the last
seven years under Rule 8.4(d) of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct,231 nor
within the last decade under Rule 8.4(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional
Conduct232, Rule 8.4(g) of the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct233 or Rule
8.4(i) of the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct.234
Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct and its commentary tracks the language of Model Rule
8.4(d) and its preexisting Comment 3. CONN. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(4), commentary (2017).
Using Connecticut’s online portal, the author conducted a Boolean search using the terms “8.4(4)” and
“bias,” “prejudice,” “harass,” “race,” “sex,” “religion,” “disability,” “national origin” and
“socioeconomic.” STATE OF CONN. JUD. BRANCH, supra note 223.
231. Rule 8.4(d) of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct and its commentary tracks the
language of Model Rule 8.4(d) and its preexisting Comment 3. ME. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d),
cmt. 3 (2017). In searching Maine’s disciplinary records, the author used the search term “8.4(d)” and
reviewed all resulting disciplinary files. Court and Grievance Decisions, STATE OF ME. BD. OF OVERSEERS
OF THE BAR, http://www.mebaroverseers.org/tools/whatsnew/index.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
232. Rule 8.4(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct tracks the language of Model Rule
8.4(d). ARK. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (2017). Its Comment 3 however states:
Subdivision (d) of this rule proscribes conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice. Such proscription includes the prohibition against discriminatory conduct
committed by a lawyer while performing duties in connection with the practice of law. The
proscription extends to any characteristic or status that is not relevant to the proof of any
legal or factual issue in dispute. Such discriminatory conduct, when directed towards
litigants, jurors, witnesses, other lawyers, or the court, including race, sex, religion, national
origin, or any other similar factors, subverts the administration of justice and undermines
the public’s confidence in our system of justice, as well as notions of equality. Legitimate
advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge’s
finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone
establish a violation of this rule. This subdivision does not prohibit a lawyer from
representing a client accused of committing discriminatory conduct.
Id. at cmt. 3. In searching for disciplinary actions under Rule 8.4(d), the author reviewed the annual
reports issued by the Arkansas Supreme Court’s Committee on Professional Conduct and Office of
Professional Conduct from 2006 to 2015. Professional Conduct Forms, ARK. JUD., https://courts.arkansas.
gov/administration/professional-conduct/annual-reports (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
233. Rule 8.4(g) of the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct makes it professional
misconduct for a lawyer to:
[C]ommit a discriminatory act prohibited by state law on the basis of sex, race, age, creed,
religion, color, national origin, disability, sexual orientation, or marital status, where the act
of discrimination is committed in connection with the lawyer’s professional activities. In
addition, it is professional misconduct to commit a discriminatory act on the basis of sexual
orientation if such an act would violate this Rule when committed on the basis of sex, race,
age, creed, religion, color, national origin, disability, or marital status. This Rule shall not
limit the ability of a lawyer to accept, decline, or withdraw from the representation of a client
in accordance with Rule 1.16.
WASH. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2017). Using Washington’s Discipline Notice Search online
portal to search for disciplinary actions under Rule 8.4(g), the author, in the dropdown menu for “RPC
Code,” selected “8.4 (g) – Commit a Discriminatory Act” and received the following result message:
“Your search returned no results. Please try again.” Discipline Notice Search, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N,
https://www.mywsba.org/DisciplineNotice.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
234. Rule 8.4(i) of the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys makes it professional
misconduct for a lawyer to “harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion, color, national
origin, disability, sexual preference or marital status in connection with the lawyer’s professional
activities. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate par. (i).” 20 WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 8.4 (West 2017). In searching for violations of Rule 8.4(i) by Wisconsin attorneys, the author
reviewed all documentation generated when searching for “8.4” through Wisconsin’s online portal.
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Though it is possible that the adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g) or similar
revisions to equivalent state rules of professional conduct will lead to a surge of
disciplinary actions, it is unlikely. With a homogenous legal profession coupled
with a lack of infrastructure for cultural competency training, the likelihood of
holding attorneys accountable for bias and discriminatory behavior that is less
than blatant is nil. Even the SCEPR in its revised report on Resolution 109 to the
House of Delegates admitted that “[t]he supreme courts of the jurisdictions that
have black letter rules with antidiscrimination and anti-harassment provisions
have not seen a surge in complaints based on these provisions.”235 As a result,
though the adoption of the anti-discrimination and anti-harassment provisions as
laid out in Model Rule 8.4(g) was (and is) a necessary step, it is insufficient alone
to lead to marked changed within our legal profession. In short, it is incumbent
upon our profession to become more culturally competent and, therefore, it is
critical that we develop the necessary infrastructure to facilitate cultural
competency education.
V. A CULTURAL COMPETENCY INFRASTRUCTURE
In light of the evidence of bias and discrimination in our legal profession, it
should no longer be tolerated for lawyers to ignore and insulate themselves and
our profession from the obligation to make cultural competency a core aspect of
our legal education and practice. It is also imperative that members of our legal
profession, bar counsel and the courts hold lawyers (and judges) accountable for
violating the rules. As “the legal profession is largely self-governing,”236 it is
incumbent upon us to remedy our system where it is flawed—and a lack of a
cultural competency infrastructure is a glaring flaw in need of a remedy. This
Article therefore focuses on three key reforms: the revision of the ABA’s law school
accreditation standards; the implementation of continuing legal education
requirements; and the inclusion of language in the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct requiring cultural competency education.

Wisconsin Attorneys’ Professional Discipline Compendium, WIS. CT. SYS., https://compendium.wicourts.
gov/app/search (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
235. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 7, at 6. According to Wendi S. Lazar, Chair of the ABA
Commission on Women in the Profession, the lack of complaints is also attributable to fear of retaliation
by victims of discrimination and harassment:
Many of my clients have experienced harassment and discrimination. Some of them have
been victim to behaviors that are unspeakable here today. Others have been asked to leave
firms because they have complained about sexual harassment and have been retaliated
against because they have complained about race discrimination. What they all have in
common is that they knew that complaining or suing in court would not give them justice—
not in our profession, sadly. The barriers to justice are just too costly for those starting out
in their careers or those deeply invested. Rather they would be further victimized, asked
politely, or not so politely, to leave the firm, sign a release, receive a severance payment or
less, or worse be forced to leave without a trace maybe because they just wouldn’t have sex
with the senior partner at their firm. She leaves, he stays. Business as usual.
House of Delegates: Rule Against Harassment and Discrimination, supra note 22, at 15:50-16:55.
236. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, AM. BAR ASS’N, Preamble & Scope [10] (2016).
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A. Cultural Competency in Legal Education
While the author applauds the ABA for its efforts in passing Model Rule
8.4(g), the author urges the ABA to go one step further and revise its accreditation
standards to require law schools to offer, and law students to complete, cultural
competency coursework. Under Standard 302 of the ABA’s Standards and Rules
of Procedures for Approval of Law Schools:
A law school shall establish learning outcomes that shall, at a minimum, include
competency in the following:
(a) Knowledge and understanding of substantive and procedural law;
(b) Legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem-solving, and written and
oral communication in the legal context;
(c) Exercise of proper professional and ethical responsibilities to clients and the
legal system; and
(d) Other professional skills needed for the competent and ethical participation as
a member of the legal profession.237

Interpretation 302-1 provides additional guidance regarding Standard 302(d),
stating that “other professional skills are determined by the law school and may
include skills such as, interviewing, counseling, negotiation, fact development and
analysis, trial practice, document drafting, conflict resolution, organization and
management of legal work, collaboration, cultural competency, and selfevaluation.”238 As a result, law schools may, but are not required to, ensure that
their law students receive cultural competency education prior to graduation.
This is incongruous with the ABA’s mandate under Goal III to “[e]liminate
bias in the legal profession and the justice system.”239 Education on bias—both
explicit and implicit—and ways in which to de-bias240 are critical to ensuring that
237.

AMER. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS
15 (2015).
238. Id. at 16.
239. ABA Mission and Goals, supra note 24.
240. A variety of different strategies exist for attempting to de-bias, including educating oneself on
becoming more self-aware and mindful, exposing oneself to a variety of individuals from diverse
backgrounds and social groups to break down any stereotypes or preconceived notions about those
individuals, attempting to step into the shoes of individuals from diverse backgrounds and social
groups to see the world from their perspective, undertaking a self-audit of one’s social networks and
social media choices and changing one’s approach to the way one interacts with people by reducing
one’s cognitive load and consciously thinking through why one is making certain decisions or reacting
a certain way towards certain individuals. See Sue Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, Five Habits for CrossCultural Lawyering, in RACE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 47 (Kimberly Holt Barrett & William H.
George eds., 2005); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8
CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001); Building Community Trust: Improving Cross-Cultural Communication in the
Criminal Justice System, AM. BAR ASS’N CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/criminal_justice/pages/buildingcommunity.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017). The New York
Times video series entitled Who, Me? Biased? highlights, as an example, criticism that because
orchestras were heavily male-dominated, bias existed in the audition selection process. Reshamwala,
supra note 81. In response, orchestras put up a screen to attempt to hide the gender of the individual
auditioning. Id. At first, placing screen between the musician and the selection committee did not alter
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 2015-2016
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we, as lawyers and legal professionals, are able to eradicate, to the extent possible,
discrimination and prejudice from our profession. And, such education should
begin when an individual matriculates into a law school.
As such, the ABA should propose to the House of Delegates a revision to the
accreditation standards that adds a new paragraph to Standard 302. Though the
exact language of the new paragraph may require further study, the language
would require law schools to establish learning outcomes that include competency
in the knowledge and understanding of behaviors, attitudes and policies that
enable the legal profession to work (or prevent the legal profession from working)
effectively in cross-cultural situations. In other words, the requirement would
obligate law schools to ensure that law students develop “the ability to adapt,
work and manage successfully in new and unfamiliar cultural settings”241 and to
create effective working relationships with clients from different backgrounds or
social groups.242
B. Cultural Competency as a Bar Licensure Requirement
“Attaining cultural competence is an ongoing process requiring a long term
educational commitment. One does not ‘become competent’ at any one point.
Instead, he or she becomes more knowledgeable, aware and sensitive in an
attempt to reach competence.”243 As such, continual cultural competency
education is necessary to manifest a cultural shift within our profession.
Under the ABA’s existing Model Rule for Continuing Legal Education (CLE),
a comment encourages participation in CLEs covering bias and discrimination:
Regulatory systems should require that lawyers, as part of their mandatory
continuing legal education either through a separate credit or through existing
ethics and professionalism credits, complete programs related to the promotion of

much the percentage of men and women hired by orchestras. Id. That is until it became apparent that
before some of the auditions, there was a “click, click, clicking” sound of high heels. Id. Once orchestras
asked those auditioning to remove their shoes, however, the percentage of men and women hired
became almost equal. Id.; see also id. (encouraging individuals to de-bias by completing a self-audit to
detect implicit bias by asking a friend to observe their behavior or by taking stock of the cultural groups
their friends either fall into or self-identify with).
241. Sylvia Stevens, Cultural Competency: Is There an Ethical Duty?, OR. STATE BAR BULLETIN, Jan.
2009, https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/09jan/barcounsel.html.
242. The manner in which law schools undertake to comply with this requirement will of course
vary across law schools, however, law schools may choose to develop a series of courses addressing
cultural competence, infuse cultural competence into existing courses and clinics or develop a
mandatory seminar, akin to the mandatory ethics courses at many law schools. See e.g., Serena Patel,
Cultural Competency Training: Preparing Law Students for Practice in Our Multicultural World, 62 UCLA L.
REV. DISC. 140, 149–56 (2014) (proposing the basic structure of a seminar on cultural competence and
the incorporation of Professors Susan Bryant and Jean Koh Peters’ Five Habits); Cynthia M. Ward &
Nelson P. Miller, The Role of Law Schools in Shaping Culturally Competent Lawyers, MICH. BAR J., Sept.
2011, at 4 (describing a scenario in which faculty could incorporate cultural competency training into
a doctrinal course by noting “[c]ontracts professors could encourage students to consider whether the
‘meeting of the minds’ and ‘contract formation’ analyses change when you have parties of different
culture.”).
243. POVERTY, HEALTH AND LAW: READINGS AND CASES FOR MEDICAL-LEGAL PARTNERSHIP 144
(Elizabeth T. Tyler et al. eds., 2011).
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racial and ethnic diversity in the legal profession, the promotion of full and equal
participation in the profession of women and persons with disabilities, and the
elimination of all forms of bias in the profession. Lawyers who practice in states
and territories that do not require mandatory continuing legal education are
encouraged to complete such programs as part of their continuing legal
education.244

However, currently, only California, Minnesota and Oregon require specific
“elimination of bias” programming for attorneys to maintain their bar licenses
within those states,245 while Hawaii, Kansas, Illinois, Maine, Nebraska,
Washington and West Virginia allow such programming to count towards
attorneys’ ethics and professionalism requirements.246
On December 21, 2016, after two years of discussion and drafting, the ABA
Standing Committee on Continuing Legal Education (SCOCLE) announced its
decision to propose a new Mandatory CLE (MCLE) Model Rule and submit a
resolution and report for the 2017 Midyear Meeting of the ABA House of
Delegates.247 In the proposal, the SCOCLE overhauled the rule and provided more
specific guidance on continuing education on bias and diversity in the black letter
of the rule. The new Section 3, entitled MCLE Requirements and Exemptions,
requires under part (A):
(2) As part of the required Credit Hours referenced in Section 3(A)(1), lawyers
must earn Credit Hours in each of the following areas:
(a) Ethics and Professionalism Programming (an average of at least one Credit
Hour per year);
(b) Mental Health and Substance Use Disorders Programming (at least one Credit
Hour every three years); and

244.
245.

MODEL RULES FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. § 2 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004).
AMER. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., COMM’N ON LAWYER
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, LAW PRACTICE DIVISION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 9 n.12 (2017); see
also CAL. RULES FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. r. 2.72(A)(2) (2014) (requiring California bar
members to complete one hour every three years of continuing legal education that “deal[s] with the
recognition and elimination of bias in the legal profession and society by reason of, but not limited to,
sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, physical disability, age, or sexual orientation”);
MINN. RULES OF THE BD. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. r. 2(G), 6(B), 9(B)(2) (2016) (requiring Minnesota
bar members to complete every three years at least two hours of “elimination of bias” courses, which
it defines as “a course directly related to the practice of law that is designed to educate attorneys to
identify and eliminate from the legal profession and from the practice of law biases against persons
because of race, gender, economic status, creed, color, religion, national origin, disability, age or sexual
orientation.”); OR. MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. RULES AND REGULATIONS r. 3.2(d), 5.15(c)
(2017) (requiring Oregon bar members to complete in alternate reporting period at least three hours of
“access to justice” courses, which it defines as an activity “directly related to the practice of law and
designed to educate attorneys to identify and eliminate from the legal profession and from the practice
of law barriers to access to justice arising from biases against persons because of race, gender, economic
status, creed, color, religion, national origin, disability, age or sexual orientation”).
246. AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 244, at 9 n.12.
247. See Proposed MCLE Model Rule, AMER. BAR ASS’N, https://americanbar.qualtrics.com/
jfe/form/SV_9MioUUDJCatwy5D (posting a notification on December 21, 2016, welcoming comments
and questions to the proposed model rule).
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(c) Diversity and Inclusion Programming (at least one Credit Hour every three
years).248

As part of its rationale, the SCOCLE noted that “Diversity and Inclusion
Programming” will “educate lawyers about implicit bias, the needs of specific
diverse populations, and ways to increase diversity in the legal profession.”249 In
February 2016, the ABA House of Delegates recognized the importance of such
programming when it adopted Resolution 107, which encourages jurisdictions
with MCLE requirements to “include as a separate credit programs regarding
diversity and inclusion in the legal profession of all persons regardless of race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disabilities, and programs
regarding the elimination of bias.”250 The new MCLE Model Rule requires the
implementation of a stand-alone credit requirement251; however, under Comment
4 of the new Section 3, the SCOCLE recognized that some jurisdictions may prefer
to require and accredit such programs under their ethics and professionalism
requirement.252 The SCOCLE noted though that “it is extremely unlikely that one
hundred percent of lawyers will elect to take Diversity and Inclusion
Programming if it is not specifically required, which is why [the new] Model Rule
recommends a stand-alone requirement.”253
In February 2017, the House of Delegates approved the proposed new MCLE
Model Rule, which was another bold and necessary step towards the elimination
of bias and discrimination in our profession. The author therefore urges states to
adopt the new rule or modify their existing CLE requirements for attorneys to
maintain their legal license to comport with the recommendations of the new rule
with respect to mandating through a stand-along requirement training on bias,
diversity and cultural competency.
C. A Fair & Impartial Judiciary
With respect to the judiciary, Rule 2.3 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
already provides significant protections against bias, prejudice and
discrimination. It requires that a judge must perform the duties of the judicial
office “without bias or prejudice.”254 It further requires that a judge, in the
performance of judicial duties, shall not, nor shall those subject to the judge’s
direction, speak or behave in a way that “manifest[s] bias or prejudice” or engage
in “harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political
affiliation. . . .”255 It also calls upon judges to require lawyers to refrain from this

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

MODEL RULE FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. § 3, 3(A)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 244 at 8.
AMER. BAR ASS’N, RESOLUTION 107 (ADOPTED) (2016).
MODEL RULE FOR MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. § 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
Id. at cmt. 4.
AMER. BAR ASS’N, supra note 244 at 9 n.12.
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.3(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
Id. at r. 2.3(B).
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behavior in “proceedings before the court. . . .”256 The comments to the rule also
provide critical guidance, noting that:
Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited to
epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor
based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of
connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant
references to personal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body language
can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others
an appearance of bias or prejudice. A judge must avoid conduct that may
reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.257

But as the preamble to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct articulates:
An independent, fair and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of
justice. The United States legal system is based upon the principle that an
independent, impartial, and competent judiciary, composed of men and women
of integrity, will interpret and apply the law that governs our society. Thus, the
judiciary plays a central role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule of
law.258

It is therefore the author’s opinion that the judiciary should be held to the
highest standard of care possible. Despite the comprehensiveness of the language
of the Model Code, plenty of evidence exists to suggest that the judiciary is not
living up to the standard of care articulated within the code.259 As Judge Bernice
B. Donald, a federal judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, stated, “We view our job functions through the lens of our experiences,
and all of us are impacted by biases and stereotypes and other cognitive functions
that enable us to take shortcuts in what we do.”260
[J]udges, like the rest of us, carry implicit biases . . . . [T]hese implicit biases can
affect judges’ judgment, at least in contexts where judges are unaware of a need to
monitor their decisions . . . . [C]onversely, when judges are aware of a need to
monitor their own responses for the influence of implicit [] biases, and are
motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.261

As such, with a minor tweak to the black letter of the Model Code requiring
the judiciary to engage in regular and frequent cultural competency training,

256. Id. at r. 2.3(C).
257. Id. at r. 2.3 cmt. 2.
258. Id. at preamble ¶ 1.
259. See supra Part IV.
260. Terry Carter, Implicit Bias is a Challenge Even for Judges, ABA J. (Aug. 5, 2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/implicit_bias_is_a_challenge_even_for_judges.
261. Rachlinski, supra note 187, at 1221; see also Dana Leigh Marks, Who, Me? Am I Guilty of Implicit
Bias?, 54 THE JUDGES’ J. 20 (Fall 2015) (acknowledging as an immigration judge and president of the
National Association of Immigration Judges that “we must accept that we are all the product of
environmental factors that imbue some degree of implicit bias and do our best to counteract its
destructive effects,” stressing that “[i]t is important that judges address the dilemma of implicit bias
vigorously” and advocating for “structural support, which means more time off the bench through
adjustment of dockets and reduced distractions. . .to ensure that [judges] have sufficient time on their
dockets to address the constant fight against implicit bias.”).
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which in turn will help them become more conscious of monitoring their own
biases, and with a conscious effort by the profession to hold judges accountable
under Rule 2.3, it is feasible that judges will be able to more readily fulfill this high
standard.262
VI. CONCLUSION
In the face of a legal profession and judicial system replete with bias,
discrimination and harassment, the American Bar Association is to be commended
for tackling a controversial topic and successfully inserting an anti-discrimination
and anti-harassment provision into the black letter of our rules of professional
conduct. But, we must not now become complacent and believe our work is done.
Though a vital step, adoption of Model Rule 8.4(g) alone is insufficient to spark
the much-needed cultural shift within our legal profession.
It is now time to ensure that the states not only adopt Model Rule 8.4(g) or
revise their existing rules of professional conduct to comport with the breadth and
depth of conduct governed by the rule; but also hold members of the profession
accountable for violating the rule. In doing so, it is imperative that bar counsel
and the courts avoid evaluating attorney discipline complaints under Model Rule
8.4(g) through the lens of the “reasonable lawyer,” which is unfortunately a
homogenous being capable of infusing bias into such decisions. Rather, when
evaluating the mens rea standard in attorney discipline cases, the relevant decision
makers should invoke the “reasonably culturally competent lawyer,” a mindful,
self-aware lawyer of “reasonable prudence and [cultural] competence.”
Moreover, it is time for us to critically evaluate our cultural competency
infrastructure—or lack thereof—and raise the bar of attorney and judicial conduct.
The proposed reforms—the revision of law school accreditation standards, the
implementation of continuing legal education requirements and the inclusion of
mandatory cultural competency training for the judiciary—will, if implemented,
encourage all lawyers and judges to become more self-aware and mindful and
ignite the necessary cultural shift in our profession. But most importantly, the
proposed reforms will remove, as much as practical, bias, prejudice,
discrimination and harassment from our legal profession and judicial system,
helping to fulfill our promise that “justice is blind.”

262. See Carter, supra note 259 (“Judges are tasked with being the most impartial members of the
legal profession. [At the ABA Annual Meeting], more than 50 of them discussed how this isn’t so easy
to do—and perhaps even impossible when it comes to implicit bias. But working to overcome biases
we don’t recognize is a job that is as necessary as it is worth doing.”).

